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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (hereinafter IDEA), 20
U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-82 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), is a detailed statute governing
special education. One detail missing concerns which party bears the burden of
proof. To understand the importance of that issue, consider the following hypo-
thetical.
Professor Darlene Dobson sits in her office in the Special Education
Department of Catatonic State University, with the beginnings of a major head-
ache. She has just returned from the Euphoria Independent School District,
where she had served as the hearing officer in a case under the IDEA. Professor
Dobson knows that this will be a tough case to decide. After a lengthy dispute,
the parents of Julia D. requested the hearing because they disagreed with Eupho-
ria's proposed educational programming and placement for their daughter. Julia
D. is a first grade child with autism.1 Euphoria proposed that Julia be placed in
* Thomas A. Mayes (J.D., Iowa; M.Ed., Lehigh) is a staff attorney with the Iowa Court of
Appeals, in Des Moines, Iowa. Perry A. Zirkel (J.D. & Ph.D., Connecticut; LL.M., Yale) is Uni-
versity Professor of Education and Law at Lehigh University, in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Dixie
Snow Huefner (J.D. & M.S., Utah) is Professor of Special Education at the University of Utah, in
Salt Lake City, Utah. All opinions expressed in this Article are solely the views of the authors.
[Vol. 108
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss1/5
2005] ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER THE IDEA 29
a multicategorical disabilities classroom, with up to two hours a day of Lovaas
discrete trial training.2 Julia's parents initially requested eight hours per day of
Lovaas training; however, they have modified their demand to four hours of
Lovaas training each day, with the remainder of the day in a general classroom.
The parties rejected pre-hearing mediation,3 and Professor Dobson was
unable to bring the parties to a last-minute agreement prior to the hearing. In
Professor Dobson's opinion, the hearing was intolerably long. Counsel for both
parties insisted on calling numerous witnesses, whose testimony was repetitive
and only marginally relevant to the child's unique needs. Professor Dobson
found herself sifting through the extraneous material for the evidence that mat-
tered. Her problem was that the evidence was equally balanced in quality, quan-
tity, and weight. Neither party proved their respective position better than the
other party. Inasmuch as the party who has the burden of proof in this case will
A Note for Readers. The IDEA was amended in 2004, effective July 1, 2005. All citations are to
the most recent version of the IDEA, unless otherwise noted. All citations to the Code of Federal
Regulations are to the 1999 implementing regulations. The regulations implementing the 2004
amendments had not yet been adopted, as of the date of this writing. If a regulation has been
superseded by statute, that will be noted.
I "Autism" is a developmental disability characterized by significant deficits in social rela-
tions and communication skills. The preferred response to autism is early, intensive intervention
targeted at the individual's social and communication deficits. Recommended interventions are
often expensive and labor-intensive, and many schools are reluctant to provide the intensive inter-
ventions requested by a child's parents or treating professionals. Disputes concerning the educa-
tion of children with autism have become increasingly common. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH AUTISM (2001); Perry A. Zirkel, The Autism Case Law:
Administrative and Judicial Rulings, 17 Focus ON AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 84
(2002).
2 For information on Professor Lovaas's method, see NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
1; Claire Maher Choutka et al., The "Discrete Trials" of Applied Behavior Analysis for Children
with Autism: Outcome-Related Factors in the Case Law, 38 J. SPECIAL EDuC. 95 (2004); 0. Ivar
Lovaas, Behavioral Treatment and Normal Educational and Intellectual Functioning in Young
Autistic Children, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 3 (1987); John J. McEachin et al., Long-
term Outcome for Children with Autism Who Received Early Intensive Behavioral Treatment, 97
AM. J. MENT. RETARDATION 359 (1993); Catherine Nelson & Dixie Snow Huefner, Young Chil-
dren with Autism: Judicial Responses to the Lovaas and Discrete Trial Training Debates, 26 J. OF
EARLY INTERVENTION 1 (2003).
3 The IDEA requires states to offer pre-hearing mediation to parties to special education dis-
putes. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1999). The litera-
ture on the mediation of special education disputes is extensive. For more information, see, e.g.,
Steven S. Goldberg & Kathleen Kelley Lynch, Reconsidering the Legalization of School Reform:
A Case for Implementing Change through Mediation, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 199 (1992);
Stephen S. Goldberg & Dixie Snow Huefner, Dispute Resolution in Special Education: An Intro-
duction to Litigation Alternatives, 99 EDUC. L. REP. 703 (West 1995); Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven
S. Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve Special Education Disputes? First Empirical
Findings, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 35 (1997); Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs into Round
Holes: Mediation and the Rights of Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53 RUTGERS L.
REV. 333 (2001); Elaine Talley, Mediation of Special Education Disputes, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L.
& POL'Y 239 (2001).
3
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lose, Professor Dobson must determine who bears this burden. What is the an-
swer to this critical question?
I. INTRODUCTION
The IDEA4 provides financial assistance to States that guarantee a "free
appropriate public education" (hereinafter FAPE) 5 to children with disabilities.
6
The IDEA's primary means of ensuring substantive compliance is a detailed
procedural scheme. Although one leading textbook described the IDEA as
"weak on substance, strong on procedure,"' the statute's remedial and proce-
dural provisions are not exhaustive. The text of the IDEA is silent on several
key questions of procedure,8 leaving gaps to be filled by courts, regulators, and
commentators.
4 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-82. See also JOSEPH R. BOYLE & MARY WEISHAAR, SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAW WITH CASES (2001); DIXIE SNOW HUEFNER, GETTING COMFORTABLE WITH
SPECIAL EDUCATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR WORKING WITH CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES (2000);
ALLAN G. OSBORNE JR., LEGAL ISSUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION (1996); LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN,
SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW (2000); STEPHEN B. THOMAS & CHARLES J. RUSSO, SPECIAL EDUCATION
LAW: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 90'S (1995); BONNIE B. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN,
THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAW (1992); H.
RUTHERFORD TURNBULL III, FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE LAW AND CHILDREN
WITH DISABILITIES (1986); JULIE K. UNDERWOOD & JULIE F. MEAD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPECIAL
EDUCATION AND PUPIL SERVICES (1995); MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND
LITIGATION TREATISE (2d ed. 2002); PETER W.D. WRIGHT & PAMELA DARR WRIGHT,
WRIGHTSLAW: SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW (1999); MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL
EDUCATION (1998).
5 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412 (a)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.121. For the definition of "free appropriate
public education," see 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.13.
6 For the definition of "child with a disability," see 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7.
7 MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 734 (3d ed. 1992).
8 Four examples of unanswered "procedural" questions under the IDEA include (1) the stan-
dard of review applicable to further administrative review of a hearing officer's decision in states
which have chosen a two-tier administrative scheme, (2) the admissibility of additional evidence
in judicial proceedings, (3) the availability of money damages as a remedy for IDEA violations,
and (4) the extent of permissible representation by lay advocates. For more information on the
first question, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Standard of Review Applicable to Pennsylvania's
Special Education Appeals Panel, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 871 (1994) [hereinafter Zirkel, Standard].
For more information on the second question, see Walker County Sch. Dist. v. Bennett, 203 F.3d
1293 (11 th Cir. 2000); Andriy Krahmal et al., "Additional Evidence" Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: The Need for Rigor, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 201 (2004). For informa-
tion on the third question, see, e.g., Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar: Section 1983 Dam-
age Claims In Special Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L. REV. 465 (2002). For more information on
the fourth issue, see, e.g., Kay Hennessy Seven & Perry A. Zirkel, In the Matter of Arons: Con-
struction of the IDEA's Lay Advocate Provision Too Narrow?, 9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 193
(2002). Until recently, the IDEA did not contain any statute of limitations, and the courts were
left to fill the gap. See, e.g., Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Statutes of Limitations for Filing a Lawsuit
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 106 EDUC. L. REP. 959 (West 1996); Perry
A. Zirkel, The Statute of Limitations Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Is
Montour Myopic?, 12 WIDENER L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Zirkel, Montour]; Perry A. Zirkel &
4
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One such major gap concerns the burden of proof. Who bears the bur-
den of proof under the IDEA? Should the parent of a child with a disability be
required to prove an IDEA violation or should schools be required to prove
compliance with the IDEA? Should the assignment of the burden of proof de-
pend on the specific procedural posture of each dispute? The statutory and
regulatory texts expressly allocate the burden of proof in only limited situa-
tions.9 Who shoulders the burden in the vast majority of other IDEA cases?
The judges and hearing officers who have addressed this issue are deeply di-
vided.10 Interest groups have asked Congress to spell out the burden of proof in
the reauthorization of the IDEA.iX The 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA does
not do so. 12 The United States Supreme Court has been asked to decide thisissue, but has refused to do so until recently. 13 Now, the United States Supreme
Peter J. Maher, The Statute of Limitations Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
175 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (West 2003). Now the IDEA contains express statutes of limitation. See
infra notes 86, 89.
9 See infra Part II; see also Thomas F. Guernsey, When the Teachers and Parents Can't
Agree, Who Really Decides? Burdens of Proof and Standards of Review Under the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67, 69 (1988); PETER W. D. WRIGHT, NAT'L
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT BURDEN OF PROOF: ON
PARENTS OR SCHOOLS? 19 (2005).
10 See generally DIXIE SNOW HUEFNER & PERRY A. ZIRKEL, BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 5-13 (1993); see also JACK B. CLARKE JR. &
MARIA E. GLESS, A LEGAL OVERVIEW OF BURDEN OF PROOF IN SPECIAL EDUCATION DISPUTES
(2003); RALPH M. GERSTEIN & LOIS GERSTEIN, EDUCATION LAW: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR
ATrORNEYS, TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, PARENTS, AND STUDENTS 249-50 (2004); ROTHSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 243-44; TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 13:19 to 13:21; WEBER, supra
note 4, at 20:11; WRIGHT, supra note 9; YELL, supra note 4, at 259-60; Guernsey, supra note 9, at
71-77; Allan G. Osborne, Proving that You Have Provided a FAPE under the IDEA, 151 EDUC. L.
REP. 367 (West 2001); Sharon C. Streett, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 19 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 35, 42, 52 (1996); Ronald D. Wenkart, The Burden of Proof in IDEA Due
Process Hearings, 187 EDUC. L. REP. 817 (West 2004); Elizabeth L. Anstaett, Note, Burden of
Proof Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 759 (1990); Anne
E. Johnson, Note, Evening The Playing Field: Tailoring the Allocation of the Burden of Proof at
IDEA Due Process Hearings to Balance Children's Rights and Schools' Needs, 46 B. C. L. REV.
591 (2005).
Some of these sources merely note the division of authority, without much more. Others are
either dated (e.g., Huefner & Zirkel, Anstaett, Guernsey), are limited in jurisdictional scope (e.g.,
Streett), or do not fully cover the pertinent cases and authorities. Few contain proposals for re-
solving the division of authority.
11 See NAT'L SCH. BDS. ASS'N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 8 (2002).
12 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
118 Stat. 2647 (2004).
13 For example, in Doe v. Arlington County School Board, 41 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603 (E.D. Va.
1999), the trial court allocated the burden of proof to the party challenging the administrative
outcome. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion. Doe v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4287 (4th Cir. 2000). The U.S. Supreme Court denied
5
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Court has granted certiorari in a case raising this issue.' 4 For the moment, its
decision will allocate the burden of proof, at least at the administrative stage of
the special education dispute process. The Court should, with certain narrow
exceptions, allocate the burden of proof to schools, regardless of who requests
the administrative hearing. Furthermore, the same burden allocation should
apply in judicial proceedings, regardless of which party prevailed at the admin-
istrative level.
The assignment of the burden of proof in special education proceedings
can be critically important. Although the "burden of proof' is an outcome-
determinative rule in civil cases in the relatively infrequent case where the evi-
dence favoring each party is of equal weight, 5 burdens of proof are important in
case analysis, preparation, and presentation. Clearly, parties in IDEA disputes
need some assistance in evaluating and resolving cases short of administrative
and judicial proceedings. The number of IDEA administrative appeals and
court cases continues to rapidly increase,16 with no clear edge in recent case
17outcomes to either schools or parents. Furthermore, the amount of resources
allocated to special education hearings and litigation strikes many commenta-
tors, including at least one of this Article's authors, as intolerably high. 18 The
confused and confusing state of the law on burden of proof contributes to undue
litigation in the resource-scarce context of education.
In Part II, this Article discusses general principles of the IDEA and bur-
den of proof, including the IDEA's express allocations of the burden of proof in
specific situations. 19 In Part III, this Article surveys the differing approaches
certiorari. Doe v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 531 U.S. 824 (2000). In their petition for writ of
certiorari, the parents alleged the lower courts erred in allocating the burden of proof. See Case
Note, 42 SCH. L. REPORTER 166 (Brad Colwell & T.C. Mattocks eds., Dec. 2000).
14 Schaffer v. Weast, 125 S. Ct. 1300 (2005); see also WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 25-26, 43-46.
15 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336, at 410 (5th ed. 1999) (stating that the
burden of persuasion's importance to a particular case is "limited to those cases in which the trier
of fact is actually in doubt"); see HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3; WEBER, supra note 4, at
20:11; see also, e.g., Waller v. Bd. of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 2d 531, 538 (D. Md. 2002) (assignment
of burden of proof was not outcome-determinative in this particular case); Steinberg v. Weast, 132
F. Supp. 2d 343, 346-47 (D. Md. 2001) (same); Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 622 A.2d 614,
617-18 (Conn. Ct. App. 1993) (same).
16 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Anastasia D'Angelo, Special Education Case Law: An Empiri-
cal Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. L. REP. 731 (West 2002).
17 See, e.g., id; see also Perry A. Zirkel, National Trends in Education Litigation: Supreme
Court Decisions Concerning Students, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 235, 241 (1998).
18 Perry A. Zirkel, Over-Due Process Revisions for the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 55 MONT. L. REV. 403 (1994) [hereinafter Zirkel, Revisions]; Perry A. Zirkel, "Transaction
Costs" and the IDEA, EDUC. WK., May 21, 2003, at 44 [hereinafter Zirkel, Costs]; see also Steven
S. Goldberg & Peter J. Kuriloff, Evaluating the Fairness of Special Education Hearings, 57
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 546, 553 (1991) (noting that due process hearings "have large personal and
transactional costs" and are "emotionally traumatic" for many participants); Kuriloff & Goldberg,
supra note 3, at 40 (same).
19 See infra Part II.
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employed by judges and regulators in situations where the IDEA does not ex-
pressly allocate the burden of proof.20 In Part IV, this Article proposes that
schools, with certain narrow exceptions, should bear the burden of proving sub-
stantive and procedural compliance with the IDEA in all IDEA issues, including
identification, programming, and placement z.2  This assignment of the burden of
proof is consistent with the IDEA's language, structure, and purpose, as well as
reflecting sound public policy.
II. BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE IDEA: AN OVERVIEW
A. Burden of Proof" General Principles
"Burden of proof' has two components: the burden of production and
the burden of persuasion.22 The "burden of production" refers to the obligation
to present evidence to prove each element of a claim or cause of action.23 This
burden is usually placed on the moving party or the party initiating a case; that
party must introduce evidence that proves each element of its claim, or make a
"prima facie" case.24 If sufficient evidence is not presented, the party bearing
the burden of production loses its case; if sufficient evidence is presented, the
20 See infra Part III.
21 See infra Part IV. This Article does not provide an in-depth treatment of allocations of the
burden of proof under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000)) or under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)). For more information on
these two statutes, see TOM E.C. SMITH & JAMES R. PATRON, SECTION 504 AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(1998); PERRY ZIRKEL & STEVEN ALEMAN, SECTION 504, THE ADA, AND THE SCHOOLS (2d ed.
2000). For a side-by-side comparison of the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA, see Perry A.
Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA and Section 504/ADA, 178 EDUC. L. REP. 629 (West 2003).
For a discussion of student discipline and Section 504, see Perry A. Zirkel, Discipline Under
Section 504 and the ADA, 146 EDUC. L. REP. 617 (West 2000) [hereinafter Zirkel, Discipline].
This Article also does not provide an in-depth discussion of which party bears the burden of proof
in cases where the burden allocation issue does not involve the IDEA, but rather involves neutral
principles of law (e.g., challenges to admissibility of evidence, motions to continue, exceptions to
"exhaustion of administrative remedies" requirement). The exhaustion issue has been frequently
litigated, and courts have uniformly held, applying neutral principles of law, that the party seeking
to avoid the exhaustion requirement has the burden of proving the existence of an exception to the
exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Koster v. Frederick County Bd. of Educ., 921 F. Supp. 1453,
1456 (D. Md. 1996); Doe v. Alfred, 906 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (S.D. W. Va. 1995).
For another example, see Plymouth-Canton Community Schools v. K.C., 40 IDELR 178 (E.D.
Mich. 2003) (party seeking to set aside a settlement agreement bears the burden of proof).
22 FLEMING JAMES JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.5 (1965); 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 336;
HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3. This dual meaning gives rise to what one commentator
described as a "lamentable ambiguity of phrase and confusion of terminology." 9 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2485, at 283 (James H. Chadbourn rev.
1981).
23 See 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 336; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, §§ 2487-88; Guernsey,
supra note 9, at 71.
24 See HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3; 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 336.
7
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issue is submitted to the finder of fact.25 In certain cases, if sufficient evidence
is presented the burden of production may shift to the opposing party, who must
present evidence to rebut the initiating party's evidence or present evidence that
would constitute an affirmative defense.26 If the defending party does not do so,
the initiating party may be entitled to a judgment. 27 The burden of production
may shift throughout the course of litigation. 8
The "burden of persuasion" involves persuading the finder of fact of the
correctness of a party's position. 29 The burden of persuasion, in contrast to the
burden of production, does not shift; as a general rule, it stays on the same party
throughout the fact-finding process. 30 The burden of persuasion in the typical
civil case is outcome-determinative only when the evidence is equally divided.31
The "burden of persuasion" rule is similar to the mythical baseball rule that a tie
goes to the runner.32 Under the burden of persuasion, the "tie" goes to the liti-
gant who does not have the burden of persuasion.33 The burdens of production
and persuasion are typically assigned to the party initiating an action; 34 however,
the burdens may be reassigned based on policy considerations.35
25 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3; 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 336; 9 WIGMORE, su-
pra note 22, § 2487, at 293 (stating that a party sustains its burden of production only by offering
"a quantity of evidence fit to be considered by the jury and to form a reasonable basis for the
verdict"); see also, e.g., Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(e).
26 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3; see, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973); see also 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2487, at 294 (noting that, based on the
strength of a proponent's evidence, a trial judge may "require the opponent to produce evidence,
under penalty of losing the case at the direction of the judge").
27 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2487.
28 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3; see, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792; 2
STRONG, supra note 15, § 336; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, §§ 2485-86, 2489.
29 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3; 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 336; 9 WIGMORE, su-
pra note 22, §§ 2485-86; see also TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 13:19; Guernsey, supra
note 9, at 71.
30 See, e.g., HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3, 14 n.5 (citing In re Rosemarie A., EHLR
507:151, 507:153 (SEA Wis. 1985)); see also 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 336; 9 WIGMORE, supra
note 22, §§ 2485-86.
31 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
32 Major League umpire Tim McClelland writes: "There are no ties and there is no rule that
says that the tie goes to the runner." Q & A with Tim McClelland, available at
http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/official- info/umpires/feature.jsp?feature=mcciellandqa
(last visited June 2, 2003).
33 William Buss, What Procedural Due Process Means to A School Psychologist: A Dialogue,
13 J. SCH. PSYCH. 298, 309 (1975) (noting the general rule that "if the case is about even, the party
with the burden of proof loses").
34 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3; see 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 337, at 411 ("In
most cases, the party who has the burden of pleading a fact will have the burdens of producing
evidence and of persuading the jury of its existence as well.").
35 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3; 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 337; 9 WIGMORE, su-
pra note 22, § 2486; WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 28-30; Buss, supra note 33, at 309; Guernsey,
supra note 9, at 71-72.
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"Burden of proof' is related to, but distinguishable from, two other legal
concepts: "quantum of proof' and "standard of review." "Quantum of proof'
(or "standard of proof") refers to the amount of evidence that a litigant must
offer before her position is accepted, when the litigant's evidence is balanced
against the other party's evidence. 36 Typical quanta of proof are "preponder-
ance of evidence," "clear and convincing evidence," and "beyond a reasonable
doubt.' 37 Under the "preponderance of evidence" standard, which is the quan-
tum of proof for civil actions under the IDEA,3 8 evidence favoring the party
with the burden of proof must be of greater weight than the evidence favoring
the defending party; in other words, the party with the burden of proof in a case
with a "preponderance of the evidence" standard must present evidence showing
that it is more likely than not that the party's position is correct. 39 If the evi-
dence is equally weighty, the party has not proved the case by a preponderance
of evidence.4 0 The party has failed to carry that party's burden of proof.
A second concept related to burden of proof is "standard of review.4n
"Standard of review" refers to the scrutiny with which a higher tribunal reviews
the factual findings of a lower tribunal.42 At one end of the spectrum, under "de
novo" review, a reviewing body gives little or no weight to a lower body's deci-
sion. 3 The reviewing body finds facts anew. At the other end of the spectrum,
a lower body's findings may be reviewed for "substantial evidence" or "abuse
of discretion." 44 These are exceedingly deferential standards of review. Under
the "substantial evidence" standard, a reviewing body will reverse a lower
body's decision only if the lower body's findings are not supported by substan-
tial evidence.45 If a reasonable person could find the evidence sufficient to ar-
36 HUEFNER & ZIkKEL, supra note 10, at 3; Zirkel, Standard, supra note 8, at 876 n.26.
37 See Zirkel, Standard, supra note 8, at 876 n.26.
38 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(b)(3)
(1999).
39 See Terry Jean Seligmann, Not as Simple as ABC: Disciplining Children with Disabilities
under the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 42 ARIZ. L. REv. 77, 99 (2000); see also 2 STRONG, supra note
15, § 339.
40 See supra notes 15, 31 and accompanying text.
41 See Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. REv. 469
(1988); Krahmal et al., supra note 8, at 203-04; James R. Newcomer & Perry A. Zirkel, An Analy-
sis of Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 469, 470-71
(1999); Zirkel, Standard, supra note 8.
42 Typically, a lower body's conclusions of law are reviewed "de novo." A reviewing body
makes its own conclusions of law, and is not bound by a lower body's legal reasoning. See
HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 15 n.31; Zirkel, Standard, supra note 8, at 877, 892.
43 Newcomer & Zirkel, supra note 41, at 470; Zirkel, Standard, supra note 8.
44 See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the "arbitrary and capri-
cious/abuse of discretion" standard, see Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
45 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(E) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(a).
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rive at the conclusion reached by the lower body, the lower body's decision is
supported by "substantial evidence," even if the evidence could conceivably
support a different result.46 As a general rule, as the standard of review becomes
more deferential, it becomes more likely that a lower body's decisions will be
affirmed.47
In typical actions before administrative bodies, the burdens of produc-
tion and persuasion are placed on the party initiating the action.48 In typical
actions for judicial review of administrative decisions, a reviewing court will
affirm an administrative decision if supported by "substantial evidence. 49 Spe-
50cial education disputes do not necessarily, however, follow typical patterns.
B. The IDEA: General Principles
Preceded by several high profile judicial decisions granting greater edu-
cational rights to children with disabilities,5' the IDEA has been referred to as
"the disability movement's Brown v. Board of Education."52 Congress enacted
the IDEA after finding that an intolerable number of children with disabilities
were inadequately educated,53 including one million children with disabilities
who were "excluded entirely" from public education.54 In enacting the IDEA,
Congress intended that all children with disabilities receive a FAPE.55
The IDEA is a funding statute. In exchange for federal financial assis-
tance, a state educational agency (hereinafter SEA) must agree to "adopt poli-
cies and procedures to ensure that it meets each" of twenty-five listed condi-
46 See, e.g., Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607 (1966); Seligmann, supra note 39, at
98-99.
47 See, e.g., Newcomer & Zirkel, supra note 41, at 477.
48 5 U.S.C. § 556(d); HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 3.
49 See, e.g., 5 § U.S.C. 706(2)(E); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Randall P.
Bezanson, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Iowa, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 33-35 (1971);
Guernsey, supra note 9, at 78.
50 See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
51 See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass'n of Retarded
Citizens v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). For more information, see, e.g.,
Edwin W. Martin et al., The Legislative and Litigation History of Special Education, THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN, Spring 1996, at 25.
52 JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 166 (1993) (referring to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). The IDEA
was previously entitled the Education for the Handicapped Act, and Part B was entitled the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act. It took its present name in 1990. Pub. L. 101-476, §
901(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1141, 1142 (amending 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400). It is also occasionally referred to
by its original Public Law number: Public Law 94-142.
53 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (Congressional findings).
54 Id. § 1400(c)(2)(B).
55 Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
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tions,56 which are designed to ensure that all children with disabilities in each
participating state receive a FAPE. SEAs in turn provide grants to local school
districts (designated "local educational agencies" by the IDEA and hereinafter
referred to as LEAs). 57 Although LEAs provide the vast majority of direct ser-
vices under the IDEA, the recipient SEAs are ultimately responsible for guaran-
teeing a FAPE to each resident child with a disability, including providing direct
educational services in certain circumstances.58 A state may not provide less
than what is required by the IDEA;59 however, the state may provide more rights
and protections.
60
1. The IDEA's Substantive Entitlement
The IDEA entitles all children with disabilities to the special education
61
and related services 62 that are needed to provide each with a FAPE. 63 Thatphrase is deceptive in its simplicity.6' In Board of Education v. Rowley,65 the
56 Id. § 1412(a). For more information on the obligations of recipient states, see Thomas A.
Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, State Educational Agencies and Special Education: Obligations and
Liabilities, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 62 (2000).
57 20 U.S.C.A. § 1413(a).
58 Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 56, at 74-80.
59 Id. at 80-82.
60 Id. at 89 & n.250.
61 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(29) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (defining "special education"); 34
C.F.R. § 300.26 (1999) (same).
62 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(26) (defining "related services"); 34 C.F.R. § 300.24 (same). For
United States Supreme Court cases on the "related services" requirement, see Irving Independent
School District v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret
F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999). For a discussion of Garret F., see, e.g., Deborah Rebore & Perry A.
Zirkel, The Supreme Court's Latest Special Education Ruling: A Costly Decision?, 135 EDUC. L.
REP. 331 (West 1999). For information on the obligation to provide "assistive technology" to
children with disabilities, see Perry Zirkel, Assistive Technology: What are the Legal Limits?, THE
SPECIAL EDUCATOR, Sept. 18, 1998, at 4; see also Janice N. Day & Dixie Snow Huefner, Assistive
Technology: Legal Issues for Students with Disabilities and Their Schools, 18 J. EDUC. TECH. 23
(2003).
63 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.121.
64 What follows are some examples of the questions that periodically arise from the murk of
this definition. "What is a 'free' education?" See, e.g., Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter,
510 U.S. 7 (1993); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Katharine T.
Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Educational Decisionmaking for the Handicapped Child, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1985); Larry Bartlett, Economic Cost Factors in Providing a Free Appropri-
ate Public Education for Handicapped Children: The Legal Perspective, 22 J.L.& EDUC. 27
(1993); Leslie A. Collins & Perry A. Zirkel, To What Extent, If Any, May Cost Be A Factor In
Special Education Cases?, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 11 (West 1992). "What is a 'public' education?"
See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Burlington Sch. Comm., 471
U.S. 359; Dixie Snow Huefner, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: A Foothill in Estab-
lishment Clause Jurisprudence?, 87 EDUC. L. REP. 15 (West 1994). "What if a child is so pro-
foundly disabled that school officials believe her or him to be 'uneducable?"' See, e.g., Timothy
W. v. Rochester Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989).
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United States Supreme Court stated that the IDEA's substantive requirement is
satisfied if a child with a disability is provided an individualized education pro-
gram (hereinafter IEP)66 which "is reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits." 67 In announcing this test, the Rowley Court re-
jected arguments that the IDEA required school districts to maximize an eligible
student's potential.68 Instead, the Rowley Court interpreted the IDEA as provid-
ing "a modest but nonetheless genuine right to beneficial, personalized instruc-
tion. 6 9
Nevertheless, the Rowley Court did not specify how much of an "educa-
tional benefit" is required to provide a FAPE to a child with a disability.70 Post-
Rowley authorities are divided.7' Some courts have ruled that "any" benefit, no
matter how small, satisfies the Rowley standard.72 Other courts have stated that
a "de minimis" benefit is not sufficient; rather, the educational benefit must be
meaningful.7 3
2. Where Must Special Education Be Provided?
The IDEA requires that children with disabilities be educated in the
"least restrictive environment" (hereinafter LRE).7 4 "To the maximum extent
65 458 U.S. 176 (1982). For more information on this decision, see, e.g., Dixie Snow Huefner,
Judicial Review of the Special Educational Requirements Under the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act: Where Have We Been and Where Should We Be Going?, 14 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 483 (1991); Perry A. Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Edu-
cation v. Rowley: Razing the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L. REv. 466 (1983).
66 For requirements for the content and development of IEPs (including members of IEP
teams), see 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) and 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.340-350.
67 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07.
68 Id. at 198.
69 Huefner, supra note 65, at 491.
70 Id. at 494; see also Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A
Parent's Perspective and Proposal for Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 331, 357 (1994) ("If pro-
gress along some type of continuum is the legal requirement, the two-pronged standard of Rowley
does not address the issue of the amount of progress that is required to meet the educational
minimum.").
71 Huefner, supra note 65, at 494-500; Kotler, supra note 70, at 357.
72 See, e.g., Karl v. Bd. of Educ., 736 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1984).
73 See, e.g., Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988).
74 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550-.556 (1999).
For more information on "inclusion" and LRE, see, e.g., Larry D. Bartlett, Mainstreaming: On the
Road to Clarification, 76 EDUC. L. REP. 17 (West 1993); Larry D. Bartlett & Scott McLeod, Inclu-
sion and the Regular Class Teacher Under the IDEA, 128 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (West 1998); Theresa
Bryant, Drowning in the Mainstream: Integration of Children with Disabilities After Oberti v.
Clementon School District, 22 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 83 (1995); Anne Proffitt Dupre, Disability and
the Public Schools: The Case Against "Inclusion," 72 WASH. L. REv. 775 (1997); Dixie Snow
Huefner, The Mainstreaming Cases: Tensions and Trends for School Administrators, 30 EDUC.
ADMIN. Q. 27 (1994); Martha M. McCarthy, Inclusion of Children with Disabilities: Is it Re-
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appropriate, children with disabilities" are to receive their education with chil-
dren without disabilities.75 An IEP must contain an explanation of why a child
with a disability receives any of her education outside of a general classroom
and apart from children without disabilities; 76 however, not all children with
disabilities will be able to receive a FAPE in the general classroom. 77 There-
fore, schools are obliged to maintain a "continuum of alternative placements. 78
In review, the substantive entitlement under the IDEA can be summed
up by the following equation: the IDEA's "core entitlement" is "FAPE with an
IEP in the LRE. 79
3. Procedural Safeguards of the Substantive Right
The IDEA contains numerous procedural safeguards. 80  The Rowley
Court viewed this procedural scheme as key to securing the IDEA's substantive
entitlement. 8' Among those rights granted to a parent of a child with a disability
quired?, 95 EDUC. L. REP. 823 (West 1995); Allan G. Osborne, Is the Era of Judicially-Ordered
Inclusion Over?, 114 EDUC. L. REP. 1011 (West 1997); Robert Rueda et al., The Least Restrictive
Environment: A Place or a Context?, 21 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 70 (2000); George P. White
& Thomas A. Mayes, Making an Appropriate Special Education Placement: Conflict Abounds!, 4
J. CASES EDUC. LEADERSHIP 9 (Spring 2001), available at http://www.ucea.org/ caseslV4-
Iss2/whitecase.pdf; Perry A. Zirkel, The "Inclusion" Case Law: A Factor Analysis, 127 EDUC. L.
REP. 533 (West 1998).
75 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(1).
76 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(4).
77 See, e.g., Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994); Stenger v. Stan-
wood Sch. Dist., 977 P.2d 660 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); see also David Kirp et al., Legal Reform of
Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 41-45
(1974).
78 34 C.F.R. § 300.55 1. The continuum of alternate placements includes, but is not limited to,
"instruction in regular classes, special classes, special schools, home instruction, and instruction in
hospitals and institutions." Id. § 300.55 l(b)(1).
79 Julie F. Mead, The Reauthorization Process of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act: Expressions of Equity, 5 J. JUST & CARING EDUC. 476, 487 & n.5 (1999) (quoted material
from Dixie Snow Huefner).
80 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500-.529. For further discussions of the various
safeguards provided to students with disabilities and their parents, see Philip T.K. Daniel, Educa-
tion for Students with Special Needs: The Judicially Defined Role of Parents in the Process, 29
J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2000); Dixie Snow Huefner, A Model for Explaining the Procedural Safeguards
ofIDEA '97, 134 EDUC. L. REP. 445 (West 1999); Kotler, supra note 70; Thomas A. Mayes &
Perry A. Zirkel, Disclosure of Special Education Students' Records: Do the 1999 IDEA Regula-
tions Mandate that Schools Comply with FERPA?, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 455 (2000); Deborah Rebore &
Perry Zirkel, Transfer of Rights Under the Individuals with Disabilities Act: Adulthood with Abil-
ity or Disability?, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 33; Seven & Zirkel, supra note 8; Perry A. Zirkel,
Caught in the Collision: A Disabled Child's Right to Confidentiality and the News Media's Right
to "Sunshine," 117 EDUC. L. REP. 429 (West 1997).
81 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06; see Daniel, supra note 80, at 11 ("Parents or guardians are seen
as equal partners; the requirement is that their voice is heard, not merely encouraged."); Huefner,
supra note 65, at 486 ("Parental participation was thought by the drafters of the Act to be the
13
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are the right to notice of the IDEA's procedural safeguards; 82 the right to par-
ticipate on the team that makes educational decisions for the child;83 the right to
notice of a proposed change in (or refusal to change) a child's identification,
evaluation, placement, or programming; 84 the right to examine "all records relat-
ing to" the child;85 and the right to request an impartial due process hearing to
challenge a child's identification, evaluation, placement, or programming. 6
87 88Schools may also request a due process hearing.87  In a minority of states, a
party dissatisfied with the initial hearing officer's decision may seek further
administrative review.89 The 2004 IDEA reauthorization provides a two-year
statute of limitations for requesting a due process hearing.
90
After exhausting available administrative remedies,91 a party dissatisfied
with the outcome of administrative proceedings may file a petition in either state
or federal court 92 within ninety days of the final administrative decision.93 The
IDEA provides that the court "shall receive the records of the administrative
proceedings," 94 "shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, '95 and
surest mechanism against ill-considered decision-making."); see also Goldberg & Kuriloff, supra
note 18, at 546; Peter J. Kuriloff, Is Justice Served by Due Process?: Affecting the Outcomes of
Special Education Hearings in Pennsylvania, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 89-92 (1985);
Kuriloff & Goldberg, supra note 3, at 38.
82 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504.
83 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(i), 1414(e); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.344, 300.534(a)(1).
84 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(3), (c); 34 C.F.R. § 300.503.
85 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. 300.501; Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 80.
86 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507.
87 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
88 See Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education Tuition Reimbursement
Claims: An Empirical Analysis, 22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 350, 351 (2001) (citing Project
Forum, Due Process Hearings: 1999 Updates (available from NASDSE, Alexandria, VA)). For
more information on second-tier administrative review, see Zirkel, Standard, supra note 8.
89 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(g); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b); Zirkel, Standard, supra note 8. For an
empirical study of outcomes in special education cases appealed to the second-tier Appeals Panel
in Pennsylvania, see James R. Newcomer et al., Characteristics and Outcomes of Special Educa-
tion Hearing and Review Officer Cases, 123 EDUC. L. REP. 449 (West 1998).
90 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)(3)(C).
91 Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a). Exhaustion is not required in certain limited
circumstances. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988); Krahmal et al., supra note 8, at
205-06; Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 56, at 84-85; see also supra note 21.
92 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512. An empirical examination of 200 ran-
domily selected, published special education court decisions identified several patterns in special
education litigation. Notably, Newcomer and Zirkel found that placement was the primary issue
in nearly two-thirds (63 %) of the studied cases. Newcomer & Zirkel, supra note 41, at 474. In
situations where placement was at issue, parents sought a more restrictive placement over three-
quarters (76%) of the time. Id.
93 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2)(B).
94 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(b)(1).
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shall grant "appropriate" relief based "on the preponderance of the evidence. 96
Appropriate relief may include compensatory education,97 tuition reimburse-
ment for unilateral private school placements,98 declaratory relief,99 injunctive
relief,'° and, in a minority of jurisdictions, money damages.'01 If a parent is the
"prevailing party" in any action brought under the IDEA, a court may award the
parent "reasonable attorneys' fees.' 0 2
Court actions attacking administrative decisions under the IDEA are
much different from the prototypical petition for judicial review of an adminis-
trative agency's decision in a contested case. Rather than affirming the agency
decision if supported by "substantial evidence" (the scope of review in almost
all administrative law actions), 0 3 the IDEA requires a reviewing court to make
95 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(b)(2). For a detailed discussion of this
provision, see Krahmal et al., supra note 8.
96 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(b)(3).
97 See, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982); Perry A. Zirkel & M. Kay
Hennessy, Compensatory Educational Services In Special Education Cases: An Update, 150
EDUC. L. REP. 311 (West 2001); Mark H. Van Pelt, Comment, Compensatory Educational Ser-
vices and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1469.
98 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(c); Florence County Sch. Dist. Four
v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985);
David S. Doty, A Desperate Grab for Free Rehab: Unilateral Placements Under IDEA for Stu-
dents with Drug and Alcohol Addictions, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 249; Mayes & Zirkel, supra
note 88; Allen G. Osborne, Jr., Reimbursement for Unilateral Parental Placements in Unapproved
Private Schools Under IDEA, 90 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (West 1994); Perry A. Zirkel, Revisiting the
Issues: Tuition Reimbursement for Special Education Students, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Winter
1997, at 122; Heather J. Russell, Note, Florence County School District Four v. Carter: A Good
"IDEA, " 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1479 (1996).
99 Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 56, at 64.
100 See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); DEORAH A. MATrISON & S.R. HAKOLA, THE
AVAILABILITY OF DAMAGES AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE IDEA, SECTION 504, AND 42
U.S.C. SECTION 1983 (1992).
101 See, e.g., Doe v. Withers, 20 IDELR 422 (W.Va. Cir. Ct. 1993); MATISON & HAKOLA,
supra note 86; Antonis Katsiyannis & Maria Herbst, Punitive Damages in Special Education, 15
J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 9 (2004); Allan G. Osborne & Perry A. Zirkel, Are Damages Available
in Special Education Suits?, 42 EDUC. L. REP. 497 (West 1988); Seligmann, supra note 8; Stephen
C. Shannon, Note, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Determining "Appropriate
Relief' in a Post-Gwinnett Era, 85 VA. L. REV. 853 (1999). For more information on Doe v.
Withers, see Perry Zirkel, Costly Lack of Accommodations, 75 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 652 (1994).
102 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(3)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513; David L. Dagley, Prevailing Under the
HCPA, 90 EDUC. L. REP. 547 (West 1994); Mitchell L. Yell & C.A. Espin, The Handicapped
Children's Protection Act of 1986: Time to Pay the Piper?, 56 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 396 (1990);
Perry Zirkel, Individuals Ineligible for Attorney's Fees, THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR, Feb. 11, 2000, at
10. Under the 2004 IDEA amendments, schools may obtain attorney fees from parents or attor-
neys for parents in certain limited situations, i.e., the attorney requested a hearing based on a
frivolous issue or the parent filed the complaint for the purposes of harassment. See 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B).
103 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing "substantial evidence" review).
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an independent review of the agency's decision.' °4 In fact, the IDEA's drafters
specifically deleted proposed language that would have subjected agency deci-
sions to deferential "substantial evidence review."'0 5  Furthermore, state law
purporting to require substantial evidence review of IDEA cases is preempted
by contrary federal law. 1
06
The Rowley Court stated that reviewing courts are to give "due weight"
to the administrative proceedings under review, 0 7 although the Court left "due
weight" undefined. It is critically important to note the Rowley Court did not
use the term "deference." 10 8 It is equally critical to note the Rowley Court in-
structed "due weight" was to be given to administrative proceedings, not the
administrative agency.' 9 In these two ways the review prescribed by Rowley is
different from traditional administrative law principles.
Lower courts have given differing meanings to "due weight," with vary-
ing ranges of deference to administrative decisions.11n In cases where reviewing
courts express greater degrees of deference to administrative decisions in special
education decisions, it is more likely that agency decisions will be affirmed."'
C. The IDEA: Specific Allocations of the Burden of Proof
In certain limited circumstances, the IDEA and its implementing regula-
tions assign the burden of proof in administrative proceedings to schools. Spe-
cifically, LEAs and other providers of direct educational services are assigned
the burden of proof in disputes concerning independent educational evaluations;
certain disputes concerning student discipline; and short-term changes in pro-
gramming and placement for children with disabilities convicted as adults and
confined to adult prisons.
First, the IDEA allocates the burden of proof to school districts in ad-
ministrative disputes concerning payment for independent educational evalua-
tions (hereinafter IEEs). The IDEA and implementing regulations require par-
ticipating states to find and evaluate children with disabilities." 2 In the event
104 Guernsey, supra note 9, at 78.
105 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982); HUEFNER&ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 14
& n.22; Guernsey, supra note 9, at 82 & n.87 (all three discussing legislative history eliminating
"substantial evidence" standard on judicial review).
106 Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 655 F.2d 428, 431-32 (1st Cir. 1981), further pro-
ceedings Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1984), affd on other
grounds sub nom. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
107 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
108 Guernsey, supra note 9, at 78-79.
109 Id.; see also Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993).
110 See Guernsey, supra note 9, at 78-89; Newcomer & Zirkel, supra note 41.
III Newcomer & Zirkel, supra note 41, at 477.
112 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1412(a)(3), 1414(a)-(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.125,
.530-.536 (1999). For a detailed discussion of the issues associated with identifying children with
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that a child's parents disagree with the school's evaluation, the statute allows
parents to "obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child."'1 13 The
implementing regulations provide further explanation of this right. Specifically,
the regulations require schools to provide an lEE at public expense "if the par-
ents disagree with an evaluation obtained by the [school]."'"14 If the school does
not wish to provide an LEE at public expense, it must "initiate a hearing to show
that its evaluation is appropriate."' 15 If the school proves that its evaluation is
appropriate, then the parents may obtain an lEE, "but not at public expense."
' 16
Second, IDEA '97 contained language arguably related to burden of
proof in several situations concerning the discipline of students with disabili-
ties.11 7 Specifically, in parental appeals of an LEP team's decision that a child's
unacceptable behavior is not a manifestation of the child's disability," 8 the
school was required to demonstrate "that the child's behavior was not a mani-
festation of the child's disability."' 19 This language was deleted in the 2004
autism, see Julie B. Fogt et al., Defining Autism: Professional Best Practices and Published Case
Law, 41 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 201 (2003).
113 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(1).
114 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1).
115 Id. § 300.502(b)(2)(ii).
116 Id. § 300.502(b)(3). For decisions concerning these issues, see Grapevine-Colleyville Sch.
Dist. v. Danielle R., 31 IDELR 103 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Broward County Sch. Bd., 35 IDELR
117 (Fla. SEA 2001).
117 For information on the discipline of students with disabilities, see Theresa J. Bryant, The
Death Knell for School Expulsion: The 1997 Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 47 Am. U. L. REv. 487 (1998); Cynthia A. Dieterich & Christine J. Villani, Func-
tional Behavioral Assessment: Process without Procedure, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 209; Anne
Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double Standards, Discipline, and the Disabled Student, 75 WASH. L.
REv. 1 (2000); Dixie Snow Huefner, Another View of the Suspension and Expulsion Cases, 57
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 360 (1991); Eileen L. Ordover, Disciplinary Exclusions of Students with
Disabilities, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 50 (2000); Allan G. Osborne, Discipline of Special-
Education Students under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
513 (2001); Seligmann, supra note 39; Perry A. Zirkel, Discipline of Students with Disabilities,
174 EDUC. L. REp. 43 (West 2003); Perry A. Zirkel, The IDEA's Suspension/Expulsion Require-
ments: A Practical Picture, 134 EDUC. L. REP. 19 (West 1999).
118 For the former procedural and substantive requirements for manifestation determination
reviews, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)-(6) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) and 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.523-.525
(1999); Richland Sch. Dist. v. Thomas P., 33 IDELR 223 (W.D. Wis. 2000); Laurens County
Sch. Dist. No. 55, 31 IDELR 204 (SEA S.C. 1999); Perry A. Zirkel, Manifest Determination?,
82 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 478 (2001) (discussing Thomas P.).
In Board of Education of the Perry Public Schools, 39 IDELR $ 251 (SEA Mich. 2003), a hearing
officer, by agreement of the school, applied the standards contained in Section 300.525 to a case
involving a student who was only eligible for accommodations under Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act. The hearing officer noted that the Section 504 regulations were "silent regarding
manifestation determinations." Id at 2204. For a discussion of discipline of students who are
solely covered by Section 504, see Zirkel, Discipline, supra note 21.
119 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(B)(i) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 34 C.F.R. § 300.525(b) (1999) (su-
perseded by statute). One commentator noted this provision required school officials to make
17
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IDEA reauthorization, 120 however, the current statute does not contain any lan-
guage that relates to the burden of proof on this issue.12' Rather, it contains no
presumed relationship or lack thereof between a child's disability and the child's
behavior.
In addition, under IDEA '97, a hearing officer "in an expedited due
process hearing" was empowered to place a student with a disability in an in-
terim alternative educational setting (hereinafter IAES) for not more than forty-
five calendar days if the school demonstrates "by substantial evidence that
maintaining the current placement of the child is substantially likely to result in
injury to the child or others."' 2 2 Further, when a parent requests an expedited
due process hearing to challenge a school's transfer of a student with disabilities
to an IAES for a drug or weapons violation, 23 the IDEA and implementing
regulations required the hearing officer to apply this same standard. 24  This
clause has been deleted from the 2004 IDEA; 125 however, the amended statute
does not expressly place the burden of proof on either parents or schools in
these appeals.
Third, the IDEA, as amended in 1997,126 allocates the burden of proof in
certain disputes concerning IEPs and educational placements of children with
disabilities who are convicted in adult criminal courts and confined to adult pris-
decisions that are "complete, thoughtful, and founded on more than mere convenience." Mead,
supra note 79, at 490.
120 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(k)(3)(A).
121 Id.
122 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)(A)(1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 34 C.F.R. § 300.521(a); Cabot Sch.
Dist., 27 IDELR 304 (SEA Ark. 1997); Dearborn Heights Sch. Dist. No. 7, 32 IDELR 106 (SEA
Mich. 1999); Or. City Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 96 (SEA Ore. 1998). As used in this provision, "sub-
stantial evidence" meant "beyond a preponderance of the evidence." 34 C.F.R. § 300.521(e)
(superseded by statute). This was an unusual quantum of proof. See Seligmann, supra note 39, at
99-100. It is greater than the quantum of proof in typical civil actions, and much greater than the
"substantial evidence" standard used in administrative law. It is not clear whether "substantial
evidence" was equivalent to the "clear-and-convincing" standard used in civil fraud cases. For
more information on expedited due process hearings, see Perry Zirkel, Understand Criteria, Re-
quirements for 'Expedited' Due Process Hearing, THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR, June 18, 2000, at 3.
123 IDEA-97 provided that "school personnel" may unilaterally place a student with disabilities
in an IAES for certain drug and weapons infractions. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(A)(1994 & Supp.
IV 1998). The 2004 reauthorization retains this language, and makes clear that schools may make
these changes without regard to whether the behavior was a manifestation of a disability. 20
U.S.C.A. § 1415(k)(1)(G) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
124 34 C.F.R. § 300.525(b)(2)(1999) (superseded by statute); see 20 U.S.C. §
1415(k)(6)(B)(ii)(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
125 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(k)(3)(B) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005). The 2004 reauthorization also
provides schools may remove a covered child to an IAES if the child "has inflicted serious bodily
injury upon another person while at school, on school premises, or at a school function under the
jurisdiction of' an SEA or LEA. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(k)(1)(G)(iii).
126 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, § 614(d)(6), Pub.L. 105-
17, 111 Stat. 37, 87 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(6)(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
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ons. 127  The statute and implementing regulations allow IEP teams to make
changes in programming or placement for such children "if the State has dem-
onstrated a bona fide security or compelling penological interest that cannot
otherwise be accommodated."' 28
Although the specific burden allocations in the IDEA are few, they are
significant. They provide a potent indicator of how judges, hearing officers, and
policy makers should fill the remaining statutory gaps.
III. JUDICIAL & ADMINISTRATIVE GAP-FILLING
The law regarding burden of proof under the IDEA is in disarray. What
happens when a hearing officer has a case before her for which the IDEA does
not expressly allocate the burden of proof, as in the case before Professor Dob-
son in the opening hypothetical? Hearing officers and administrative rule-
makers have been bewilderingly inconsistent in allocating the burden of proof
before hearing and review officers. 129 Similarly, courts have taken divergent
approaches to assigning the burden of proof in IDEA court cases. 3 ° Some au-
thorities allocate the burden based on a party's status (e.g., to the LEA regard-
less of circumstance). 131 Others allocate the burden of proof based on circum-
stance (e.g., to whichever party, be it parent or school, that challenges the ad-
ministrative outcome). 132 This Part examines the varying approaches, organiz-
ing them on a Circuit-by-Circuit basis, with examination of key reported judicial
decisions and, where available, administrative rules, regulations, and decisions.
127 For information on the special education rights of inmates with disabilities, see LOREN
WARBOYS ET AL., CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE SPECIAL EDUCATION MANUAL (1994); Peter E.
Leone et al., Understanding the Overrepresentation of Youths with Disabilities in Juvenile Deten-
tion, 3 D.C. L. REV. 389 (1995); Thomas A. Mayes, Denying Special Education in Adult Correc-
tional Facilities: A Brief Critique of Tunstall v. Bergeson, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 193; Thomas
A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, The Intersections of Juvenile Law, Criminal Law, and Special Edu-
cation Law, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 125 (2000); T. Rowand Robinson & Mary Jane K.
Rapport, Providing Special Education in the Juvenile Justice System, 20 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL
EDUC. 19 (1999); Perry Zirkel & Thomas Mayes, Are Inmates with Disabilities Entitled to Special
Education?, THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR, Aug. 25, 2000, at 3. For two general discussions of persons
with disabilities and the criminal justice system, see, e.g., Thomas A. Mayes, Persons with Autism
and Criminal Justice: Core Concepts and Leading Cases, 5 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 92
(2003); Laurence Miller, Brain Injury and Violent Crime: Clinical, Neuropsychological, and
Forensic Considerations, J. COGNITIVE REHABILITATION, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 12.
128 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(7)(B); 34 C.F.R. 300.311(c) (emphasis added). The power provided
under these provisions is limited. The allowable changes may last only so long as the emergent
circumstance lasts. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 127, at 138. If a more permanent change is
desired, then the IDEA's usual procedures must be followed. Furthermore, neither administrative
convenience nor cost control, standing alone, is considered to be "a bona fide security or compel-
ling penological interest." Id. at 138-39; Zirkel & Mayes, supra note 127, at 3.
129 See infra Part III.
130 See infra Part III.
131 See, e.g., Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
132 See, e.g., Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1991).
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A. The District of Columbia Circuit
1. Administrative Proceedings
At the administrative level in the District of Columbia, the LEA bears
the burden of proof. In the landmark case of Mills v. Board of Education of the
District of Columbia,133 a predecessor to the IDEA, the school district was as-
signed "the burden of proof as to all facts and as to the appropriateness of any
placement, denial of placement, or transfer."' 134 Cases occurring after the pas-
sage of the IDEA have followed Mills in assigning the burden of proof at the
administrative stage to the LEA, 135 and District regulations specifically allocate
the burden of proof to the LEA.136 In Hammond v. District of Columbia, a fed-
eral district judge remanded a portion of a family's claim for compensatory edu-
cation for further administrative proceedings, in part because the hearing officer
assigned the burden of proof to the parents. 1
37
2. Judicial Proceedings
In IDEA actions in the federal courts of the District of Columbia, the
burden of proof is on the party attacking the administrative outcome. 38 More
specifically, the District of Columbia Circuit placed the burden in that manner,
based on its conclusion that Rowley required it to give "deference" to hearing
and review officers. 139
133 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
134 Id. at 881.
135 Davis v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 1209, 1211-12 (D.D.C. 1982); see Kroot v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 800 F. Supp. 976, 981-82 (D.D.C. 1992).
136 D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5, § 3030.3 (2005).
137 35 IDELR 121 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Mills and Kroot).
138 Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Leonard v. McKenzie, 869
F.2d 1558, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1989); accord Angevine v. Smith, 959 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(following Kerkam and Leonard); Andersen v. District of Columbia, 877 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (same); Fagan v. District of Columbia, 817 F. Supp. 161, 166 (D.D.C. 1993) (same).
139 Kerkam, 862 F.2d at 887. In allocating the burden of proof to the party attacking the admin-
istrative decisions, the Kerkam court harmonized its new rule with prior cases that appeared to
place the burden of proof on the schools. See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527 (D.C. Cir.
1985). The Kerkam court noted that, in the prior cases, the schools were attacking the administra-
tive outcome. 862 F.2d at 887 (discussing McKenzie).
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B. The First Circuit: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico,
and Rhode Island
1. Judicial Proceedings
In federal courts in the First Circuit, the party challenging the adminis-
trative decision has the burden of proof. 40 In Town of Burlington v. Massachu-
setts Department of Education, the First Circuit allocated the burden to the chal-
lenger based on that court's reading of Rowley and an extension of general rules
of administrative law to special education cases. 141 In Roland M. v. Concord
School Committee,142 the First Circuit applied this principle to issues of proce-
dural compliance. The Roland M. court held that the parents had the burden of
proving that the school's procedural violations resulted in a denial of a FAPE,
where a hearing officer found no harm caused by procedural violations.
43
2. Administrative Proceedings
Regarding who bears the burden of proof in administrative proceedings,
this Circuit was silent until 2004. In T.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick School Com-
mittee,144 the First Circuit, in a footnote, stated that schools had the burden of
proof at the administrative level. In Lang v. Braintree School Committee, a fed-
eral court in Massachusetts stated that the party challenging the status quo has
the burden of proof, 45 although it is unclear whether this allocation applied to
140 Town of Burlington v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 794 (1st Cir. 1984), affd on
other grounds sub nom. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
In an earlier case, the First Circuit placed the burden of proof on the party seeking to change the
status quo. See Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983). The procedural
posture of Doe was unique. Rather than a review of an administrative decision, the moving party
sought a preliminary injunction to avoid the stay-put rule and administrative procedures.
HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 18 & n.105. "Since there had been no state hearing, there
could be no losing party at that level." Id.
141 Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 794.
142 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990).
143 Id. at 994-95. One further facet of Roland M. deserves a brief note. Associate Justice David
Souter, then Circuit Judge Souter. was on the Roland M. panel. Id. at 986 & n.*. He heard oral
argument (on June 4, 1990) and participated in the panel's post-argument conference; however, he
"did not participate in the drafting or the issuance of the panel's opinion," which occurred on
August 3, 1990. Id. In the interim, Judge Souter was elevated to the Supreme Court of the United
States. It would be hazardous to conclude, however, that Justice Souter would definitely arrive at
the same conclusion in a similar case before the Supreme Court. First, one tempts fate when one
predicts how any judge will rule. Second, Judge Souter was limited by prior First Circuit prece-
dent (Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 794); in contrast, Justice Souter would not be so con-
strained.
144 361 F.3d 80, 82 n.1 (I st Cir. 2004).
145 Lang v. Braintree Sch. Comm., 545 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Mass. 1982). In Lang, the
court allocated the burden of proof to the school district because of the school's procedural viola-
tions and because the school proposed a change to the status quo. Id. Given the importance of the
21
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the administrative stage of a special education dispute, the judicial stage, or
both. Maine, by regulation, allocates the burden of production to the party re-
questing the hearing.' 46
C. The Second Circuit: Connecticut, New York, and Vermont
1. Federal Court Decisions
The Second Circuit has taken a circuitous route to its burden of proof al-
location. In Briggs v. Board of Education,147 the Second Circuit did not address
the issue; however, some commentators construed language used in Briggs as
placing the burden in judicial proceedings on the party challenging the outcome
of the administrative hearing. 148 After Briggs, the district courts of the Second
Circuit initially were divided. Some courts placed the burden on the party chal-
lenging the outcome of the administrative hearings. 149 Others placed the burden
of proof on school districts to prove compliance with the IDEA's requirements,
regardless of which party prevailed before the agency. 1
50
Beginning in 1998, the Second Circuit began to resolve the intra-Circuit
split of authority. In Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, the Second
Circuit held, relying on New York hearing officer cases, that the burden of proof
at due process hearings is borne by the schools.15' The Walczak court took the
preservation of the status quo to the Lang court, we believe that this case stands for the proposi-
tion that the challenger to the status quo bears the burden of proof even in cases where there has
no procedural violation by the school district. For a brief discussion of Lang, see Zirkel, supra
note 65, at 485.
Dr. Allan Osborne, a Massachusetts school principal and a prolific writer in the field of special
education law, cites Lang as placing the burden of proof on the school district (at least at the judi-
cial review stage). Osborne, supra note 10, at 369 & n.10. We believe that Dr. Osborne misreads
Lang. The school in Lang bore the burden of proof, not because it was the school, but because it
had committed a procedural violation and, most important, was proposing a change in the status
quo.
146 05-071-101 ME. CODE R. § 13.12(I) (Weil 2004).
147 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989). Although not addressed by the Second Circuit, the parents
raised the burden-of-proof issue in district court. See HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 19
n.137. For the lower court opinion, see 707 F. Supp. 623 (D. Conn. 1988).
148 See, e.g., Julie Mead, Expressions of Congressional Intent: Examining the 1997 Amend-
ments to the IDEA, 127 EDUC. L. REP. 511, 516 (West 1998); cf Mavis v. Sobel, 839 F. Supp.
968, 985 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (disagreeing with assertion that Briggs resolved the burden of proof
question in the Second Circuit).
149 Evans v. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 83, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Hiller v. Bd. of Educ., 743 F.
Supp. 958, 967-68 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
150 Wall v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Sch. Dist., 945 F. Supp. 501, 511 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Mavis,
839 F. Supp. at 985 (burden on LEA, at least concerning LRE).
151 142 F.3d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing New York SEA decisions); see also HUEFNER &
ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 6 & 17 n.61 (LEA has burden of persuasion (citing early SEA deci-
sions)). Some earlier New York administrative decisions had allocated the burden of proof to the
child's parents. See Zirkel, supra note 65, at 485 & n.133.
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administrative decisions of a single state and apparently elevated those decisions
to the law of the Circuit. The Second Circuit extended the Walczak rule in M.S.
v. Board of Education.152 The M.S. court held that the school shouldered the
burden of proving substantive and procedural compliance with the IDEA, at
both the administrative and the judicial stage. 53 The Second Circuit, however,
created a limited exception. In tuition reimbursement cases, 54 the parents of a
child with a disability must prove the appropriateness of the private place-
ment.
5 5
The manner in which the Second Circuit announced its allocation of the
burden of proof is unusual. First, it dramatically extended Walzcak in M.S.
Second, the M.S. court's decision contained no reference to the division of au-
thorities within the Second Circuit, and no rationale for allocating the burden of
proof to schools. Given the deep division of authority, one would have expected
more discussion from the Second Circuit about why it adopted the particular
rule.
2. State Regulations
Connecticut's state law changed after Walczak and M.S. Prior to these
two cases, state regulations provided that the burden of production in adminis-
trative hearings lies with the party requesting the hearing. 156 In addition, Con-
necticut state court decisions allocated the burden of proof in court cases to the
party attacking the administrative outcome. 57 In July 2000, the Connecticut
Department of Education significantly revised state regulations on burden of
proof. 58 First, the Department deleted the regulation which placed the burden
152 231 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2000); see also A.A. v. Philips, 386 F.3d 455 (2d Cir. 2004); Warton v.
New Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 217 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. Conn. 2002). After Walzcak but before M.S.,
a federal judge in Connecticut ruled that the party challenging the IEP (at the administrative stage)
and challenging the administrative outcome (on judicial review) bore the burden of proof, but
without citation to state or federal authority. See Mr. & Mrs. H. v. Region 14 Bd. of Educ., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 106, 109 (D. Conn. 1999).
153 231 F.3d at 102-04.
154 See supra note 98 (discussing the remedy of tuition reimbursement under the IDEA).
155 M.S., 231 F.3d at 104 (citing Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir.
1995)). In tuition reimbursement cases, the appropriateness of the parent's private placement is
only an issue if the school's proposed placement is found to be inappropriate. If the school's
proposed placement is found to be appropriate, the parent's claim fails, regardless of the merits of
the parent's placement. See supra note 98 (discussing the remedy of tuition reimbursement under
the IDEA).
156 CoNN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-2(f)(4) (1990); see also Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 753 F. Supp.
65 (D. Conn. 1990).
157 Cheshire Bd. of Educ. v. Conn. State Bd. of Educ., 17 EHLR 942 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991).
158 See 62 CoNN. L.J. 3 (July 18, 2000). These regulations were published four days after M.S.
was argued, but before it was decided. M.S., 231 F.2d at 96 (argued on July 14, 2000).
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of proof upon the party requesting the administrative hearing. 59 Second, the
Department enacted a new regulation concerning the burden of proof.' 60 This
new regulation placed the burden of production ("the burden of going forward")
on the party requesting the due process hearing; however, the school has the
burden of persuasion "in all cases."'16 1 Like the Second Circuit in M.S.,162 the
Department created an exception for tuition reimbursement cases. 63 If a school
fails to prove its proposed placement was appropriate, then the party requesting
tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement of a child with a disability must
prove that the unilateral placement was appropriate.'
64
Finally, New York has a special regulation governing the education of
students with disabilities who are placed in hospitals operated by the Office of
Mental Health, in residential schools operated by the Office of Mental Retarda-
tion and Developmental Disabilities, or in child care institutions. 165 If one of
these facilities determines that a resident student may profit from public school
instruction, that institution may recommend that student to the school district in
which the facility is located. 66 If the local school district determines that it is
unable to provide a FAPE or arrange for the provision of a FAPE to the student,
it must notify the parent and the facility. 167 The parent may request a hearing,
and the local school district has the burden of proving that it is neither able to
provide a FAPE to the student nor arrange for the provision of a FAPE else-
where.1
68
D. The Third Circuit: Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and The Vir-
gin Islands
The state and federal courts of the Third Circuit have issued several de-
cisions on burden of proof, many of which are favorable to parents. Most of
these decisions contain thorough discussions of the issue. 169  These leading
cases are widely discussed in opinions from other courts 170 and by commenta-
159 62 CONN. L.J. at 8B (deleting CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-2(f)(4)).
16o Id. at 17B (enacting CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14 (2000)).
161 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14(a) (2003).
162 See M.S., 231 F.2d at 104.
163 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14(c).
164 Id.
165 N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. VIII, § 200.11 (2002).
166 Id. § 200.11 (a)(1).
167 Id. § 200.11 (c).
168 Id. § 200.1 l(c)(1).
169 For example, the Third Circuit's opinions in Oberti v. Board of Education, 995 F.2d 1204
(3d Cir. 1993), and in Carlisle Area School District v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995), con-
tain seven paragraphs and four paragraphs, respectively, that discuss burdens of proof.
170 In a search of the LEXIS computer aided legal research database conducted by the lead
author on November 14, 2003, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Lascari v. Board of
[Vol. 108
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss1/5
20051 ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER THE IDEA 51
tors.17 1 Anyone concerned with burden-of-proof issues in special education
must carefully consider the Third Circuit's authorities.
1. The New Jersey Supreme Court's Lascari Decision
A leading case in the Third Circuit is a state court case. In Lascari v.
Board of Education,172 the Supreme Court of New Jersey placed the burden of
proof upon the school district at the administrative stage. 173 Dissatisfied with
the services offered by the Ramapo Indian Hills High School District, John Las-
cari's parents enrolled him at the Landmark School, an out-of-state boarding
school. 174 John's parents sought tuition reimbursement from Ramapo, which
was denied after several administrative and judicial reviews. 75 The Lascaris
appealed to New Jersey's highest court.
17 6
The Lascari court provided four justifications for allocating the burden
of proof to school districts. First, the IDEA imposes an obligation on schools to
provide a FAPE to children with disabilities, and provides to families a detailed
"regulatory scheme" to protect that right.177 The Lascari court concluded that
placing the burden of proof on schools was akin to the procedural protections
provided by the IDEA. 178 Second, the school is more likely to have or be able to
obtain needed evidence. 179 Third, the school is arguably more aware of the re-
quirements imposed by special education law. 80 Fourth, the nature of the pro-
ceedings (tried before a hearing officer and reviewed by a court sitting without a
jury) and the common interest in educating a child with a disability both support
allocating the burden to schools.'
8 1
After reviewing these factors, the Lascari court announced its rule:
Education, 560 A.2d 1180 (N.J. 1989) was cited by seven federal courts outside of the Third
Circuit. The Third Circuit's Oberti decision, 995 F.2d 1204, was cited by 38 courts outside of the
Third Circuit.
171 In the LEXIS search referred to above, see supra note 170, Lascari was cited by nine law
review articles and Oberti was cited by 56 law review articles.
172 560 A.2d 1180 (N.J. 1989).
173 Id. at 1182. In later portions of its opinion, the Lascari court stated that it was placing the
burden of proof on the school in all cases where any party "seeks to change" the child's IEP. Id.
at 1188. In that sense, Lascari may be construed to not apply in cases where the change of an LEP
is not at issue (i.e., no IEP, disputes about implementation, disputes about placement). When the
opinion is read as a whole, that construction is too limiting.
174 Id. at 1184-85.
175 Id. at 1185-87.
176 Id. at 1]187.
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To conclude, we believe the obligation of parents at the due-
process hearing should be merely to place in issue the appropri-
ateness of the IEP. The school board should then bear the bur-
den of proving that the IEP was appropriate. In reaching that
result, we have sought to implement the intent of the statutory
and regulatory schemes. 
182
Applying this rule to the case before it, the New Jersey Supreme Court con-
cluded that the school had failed to meet its burden of proof and reversed the
lower court's decisions in favor of the school.
83
2. The Third Circuit's Oberti Decision
In Oberti v. Board of Education, 84 the Third Circuit first definitively al-
located the burden of proof in IDEA disputes. 85 Rafael Oberti was a child with
Down Syndrome and a student of the Clementon School District in New Jer-
sey. 186 Rafael's parents wanted him to receive his education in a general class-
room in his neighborhood school; in contrast, Clementon proposed a placement
in a segregated classroom "in a different district.'' 187 After a due process hear-
182 Id. at 1188-89.
183 Id. at 1193. Notably, the appropriateness of the private placement was not at issue in Las-
cari. "In fact, the board sought to establish the appropriateness of its own program by proving
that it was similar to the Landmark program." Id. at 1192. The board attempted to argue that the
Landmark school was not the LRE, but that argument was rejected by the court. Id. at 1191-92.
184 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993), aff'g 801 F. Supp. 1392 (D.N.J. 1992). For discussions of
Oberti, see Bryant, supra note 74; Brooke R. Whitted & Shelley Davis, Oberti v. Board of Educa-
tion: A Rational View, 31 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 132 (1997); Daniel G. Lyons, Comment, IDEA -
The Third Circuit Sets Its Standards for Interpreting the Mainstreaming Requirement of the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act - Oberti v. Board of Education (1993), 39 VILL. L. REV.
1057 (1994); Daniel H. Melvin, II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44
DEPAUL L. REv. 599 (1995).
In Molly L. v. Lower Merion School District, 194 F. Supp. 2d 422 (E.D. Pa. 2002), a federal dis-
trict judge applied the Oberti burden-of-proof allocation to a case involving a student who was
solely eligible under Section 504. We disapprove of the extension of IDEA burden allocations to
Section 504 cases. Our proposed burden allocation is largely informed by the IDEA's detailed
language, see infra Part IV.A, and Section 504 lacks such detailed language.
185 In Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1982), the Third Circuit made references to
burdens of proof; however, this was not at issue on appeal. For more discussion of Grymes, see
HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 10 & nn.133-36.
In Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Board of Education, 993 F.2d 1031, 1034-1035 (3d Cir. 1993), the
Third Circuit reprinted a trial court decision, in its entirety, which cited Lascari for the proposition
that the LEA always bears the burden of proof whenever "a change in the child's IEP is sought."
186 995 F.2d at 1206.
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ing requested by Rafael's parents, 188 an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter
"AL") ruled in favor of Clementon.
189
Rafael's parents filed a complaint in federal district court. 190 After the
trial court denied cross motions for summary judgment, 191 the court reviewed
the administrative record and held a three-day-long evidentiary hearing in May
1992.192 In August 1992, the district court ruled in favor of the Obertis and
Clementon appealed. 193
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
Clementon violated the IDEA. 194 Clementon claimed "once the [ALJ] decided
in its favor, the burden should have shifted to the parents who challenged the
agency decision in the district court."'195 Clementon based its argument on Row-
ley's admonition that trial courts must give "due weight" to state administrative
proceedings.
196
The Oberti court rejected Clementon's argument, however, and held the
district court did not err in placing the burden on the district. 197 According to
the court, Rowley required due weight to be given "to the administrative pro-
ceedings, not to the party who happened to prevail in those proceedings."'
198
The court reasoned:
Given that the district court must independently review the evi-
dence adduced at the administrative proceedings and can re-
ceive new evidence, we see no reason to shift the ultimate bur-
den of proof to the party who happened to have lost before the
state agency, especially since the loss at the administrative level
188 Id. at 1209 ("three-day due process hearing").
189 Id. at 1209.
190 Id. at 1210.
191 Id. The order denying the motions for summary judgment was reported at 789 F. Supp.
1322 (D.N.J. 1992).
192 995 F.2d at 1210-12.
193 Id. at 1212-13. The trial court's decision is reported at 801 F. Supp. 1392 (D.N.J. 1992).
Interestingly, after the Oberti district court decisions, but before the Third Circuit's Oberti deci-
sion, a different federal district judge in New Jersey ruled that the party challenging the adminis-
trative outcome had the burden of proof. Remis v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 815 F. Supp. 141,
143 (D.N.J. 1993). The different allocation, however, was not outcome-determinative. In Remis,
the educational agency was challenging the AL's decision and would have borne the burden of
proof as well under the Oberti district court decisions. Compare this result with the decision in
Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. ofEduc. v. S.O., 19 IDELR 15, 17 (D.N.J. 1992), in which the federal dis-
trict court followed Lascari.
194 995 F.2d at 1224.
195 Id. at 1218.
196 Id. (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206).
197 Id. at 1219-20.
198 Id. at 1219 (emphasis added).
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may have been due to incomplete or insufficient evidence or to
an incorrect application of the Act.1 99
The Oberti court concluded that it could, consistent with the IDEA, simultane-
ously give "due weight" to the administrative stage of the dispute and place the
burden of proof on the LEA.2°
The Oberti court supported its burden allocation with the following
considerations. First, placing the burden of proof on parents would dilute the
protections that the IDEA provides to parents.2°' Second, schools have superior
access to evidence, "greater control over the potentially more persuasive wit-
,,202nesses," and "greater overall educational expertise than the parents. The
Oberti court concluded that "when the IDEA's mainstreaming requirement is
specifically at issue, it is appropriate to place the burden of proving compliance
with the IDEA on the school."2 3 According to the court, the IDEA's "strong
presumption in favor of mainstreaming ... would be turned on its head" if par-
ents had to demonstrate affirmatively that their children with disabilities be-
longed in a general classroom. 2°4 The Oberti decision has been extended by
other courts in the Third Circuit to issues other than "mainstreaming" or least
restrictive environment. 0 5
3. The Third Circuit's Carlisle Decision
After Oberti, it was unclear which party would bear the burden of proof
when the parents, as opposed to the school, requested a more restrictive place-
ment.20 6 In Carlisle Area School District v. Scott p.,207 the Third Circuit pur-
ported to answer this question. In Carlisle, the Third Circuit held that parents
had the burden of proving the appropriateness of a more restrictive placement.20 8
In doing so, the Carlisle court relied on one of Oberti's factors: "a strong pre-
sumption in favor of mainstreamrg.
' 20 9
199 Id. (emphasis added).
200 Id.; see also Laughlin v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
12, 1994) (placing burden on LEA in district court, even though LEA prevailed at administrative
level).
201 Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219.
202 Id. (citing Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1188).
203 Id.
204 Id.; see also Buss, supra note 33, at 309; Kirp et al., supra note 77, at 136.
205 See, e.g., Delaware County Intermediate Unit v. Martin K., 831 F. Supp. 1206, 1214 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).
206 See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 74, at 113.
207 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995).
208 Id. at 533.
209 Id. (quoting Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1214).
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The Carlisle court's burden allocation rests on shaky procedural
ground. At best, the court's burden allocation is dicta. Carlisle concerned the
family's request for tuition reimbursement and compensatory education. 210 The
trial court found, and the Third Circuit affirmed, that the school district's pro-
posed placements were appropriate. 21' As the school district had met its burden
of compliance with the IDEA, the court's inquiry should have ended at that
point. It was entirely unnecessary to allocate the burden of proof.21 2 The Third
Circuit may wish to revisit the question posed in Carlisle, but in a case in which
the question is properly before the court and necessary to the case's decision.
4. Pennsylvania's Law on Burden of Proof: State Law in a State of
Flux
Pennsylvania's burden-of-proof allocation has markedly changed over
time. In the PARC consent decree1 3 and an implementing regulation,2 4 the
school district had a very modest burden of production, which was satisfied
when the district introduced an "official report recommending a change in edu-
cational assignment. ' '2 1 Upon receipt of this official report, the burden of pro-
duction shifted to the parents.2t 6 Neither PARC nor the regulation specified
217which party bore the burden of persuasion. The regulation also did not ad-
dress which party bore the burden of production "when the parent, rather than
the LEA, was the party seeking a change in the child's educational status. 21 8
Pennsylvania courts219 and administrative officers220 interpreted this regulation
to place the burden of proof on the party challenging the status quo, with many
hearing officers expressly allocating the burden of production to the party chal-
221lenging the status quo.
210 Id. at 523.
211 Id. at 534.
212 Since the school offered an appropriate education, albeit one rejected by Scott P.'s parents,
the school met the burden imposed on it by Oberti and the tuition reimbursement analysis should
have come to an end. For more information on the law of tuition reimbursement, see, e.g., Mayes
& Zirkel, supra note 88.
213 Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 297, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
[hereinafter PARC].
214 22 PA. CODE § 13.32(15) (1977).
215 See supra notes 213-14.
216 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 5.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 5 & 15 n.43 (citing court decisions); see also Fitz v. Intermediate Unit 29, 403 A.2d
138 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (placing burden on parent to prove inappropriateness of school's
offered education in tuition reimbursement case).
220 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 5 & 15 n.45 (citing SEA decisions).
221 Id.
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Pennsylvania amended its regulations in 1990 and deleted all references
to burden of proof.222 The first post-amendment decisions were split.223 Some
applied pre-amendment rules, while others placed the burden on the party seek-
ing the more restrictive placement. 224 After Oberti, the burden-of-proof issue
appeared to be resolved in Pennsylvania state courts; however, a recent Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court decision has cast renewed doubt on this issue.
In Mars Area School District v. Laurie L.,225 the Commonwealth Court held that
Laurie L. had the burden of proof because she had requested a due process hear-
ing concerning the District's decision that her son was no longer eligible for
226special education. The Commonwealth Court reversed an administrative rul-
ing in favor of Laurie L. and her child.227
In Laurie L., the Commonwealth Court relied on a state administrative
regulation, which provides that a parent of a child with a disability may request
an "impartial due process hearing" when that parent disagrees with a District's
"evaluation," among other things.228 This regulation does not specify which
party bears the burden of proof. More important, the Commonwealth Court did
not distinguish, much less mention, the substantial body of law developed by the
federal courts of the Third Circuit, which assigns the burden of proof in a differ-
229ent manner. In Laurie L., the Commonwealth Court created a situation in
which the outcome of any future Pennsylvania special education dispute may be
determined by whether the case is litigated in the Commonwealth Court or in
federal district court.
5. Delaware's State Statute
230By statute, Delaware allocates the burden of proof to schools. In con-
trast to the Third Circuit's Carlisle decision, 231 Delaware's state law apparently
makes no distinction for cases in which the parents seek a more restrictive
placement.232
222 Id. at 5 & 16 n.46 (citing 22 PA. CODE § 14.64).
223 Id. at 5 & 16 nn.47-48.
224 Id. at 5 & 16 n.48 (citing In re Chanse B., 17 EHLR 208 (Pa. SEA 1990)).
225 827 A.2d 1249 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
226 Id. at 1255.
227 Id. at 1258.
228 Id. at 1255 & n.15 (citing 22 PA. CODE § 14.162(b)).
229 See supra notes 169-212 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit cases).
230 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3140 (2005).
231 62 F.3d at 533.
232 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3140.
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E. The Fourth Circuit: Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vir-
ginia, and West Virginia
A long line of Fourth Circuit cases places the burden of proof on the
party challenging the outcome of the administrative proceedings in federal dis-
trict court. 233 Regarding the burden of proof at administrative hearings, the
Fourth Circuit recently resolved234 an intra-Circuit split of authority. 235 The
Fourth Circuit now allocates the burden of proof to the party initiating the pro-
ceeding,236 and this decision is now being reviewed by the United States Su-
preme Court.237 The Fourth Circuit arrived at this decision following years of
protracted litigation involving a claim for tuition reimbursement for a Maryland
child named Brian Schaffer.
1. The Brian S. Litigation
In Brian S. v. Vance,238 the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland held that the school had the burden of proof in administrative pro-
ceedings under the IDEA. In the first administrative decision in this case, the
ALJ determined the allocation of the burden of proof to be "critical., 239 Ulti-
mately, the ALJ allocated the burden to Brian's parents, concluded that they had
not met their burden, and ruled for the school. 240
233 See Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 1991); Tice v. Botetourt
County Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200, 1206 n.5 (4th Cir. 1990); Spielberg v. Henrico County Pub. Sch.,
853 F.2d 256, 258 n.2 (4th Cir. 1988); Frederick v. Vance, 30 IDELR 752 (D. Md. 1999);
Fritschle v. Andres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 500, 508 n.21 (D. Md. 1999); Doe v. Arlington County Sch.
Bd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603 (E.D. Va. 1999); Jones v. Bd. of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 2d 783, 786 n.3
(D. Md. 1998); King v. Bd. of Educ., 999 F. Supp. 750, 768 (D. Md. 1998); cf. Bales v. Clarke,
523 F. Supp. 1366, 1370 (E.D. Va. 1981) (placing burden on parents, where school district pre-
vailed at administrative level). One may read Bales's brief reference to burden of proof as placing
the burden of proof on parents, as parents; however, such a reading is no longer tenable based on
subsequent Fourth Circuit cases which announce a different rule while still commanding the same
result.
234 Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004). In Brian S. v. Vance, the trial court noted
that the Fourth Circuit had this question before it in 1980, but did not answer it. 86 F. Supp. 2d
538, 539 n.l (D. Md. 2000) (citing Stemple v. Bd. of Educ., 623 F.2d 893, 896 (4th Cir. 1980)),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Schaffer v. Vance, 2 Fed. App'x 232 (4th Cir. 2001), further
proceedings sub nom. Weast v. Schaffer, 240 F. Supp. 2d 396 (D. Md. 2002), rev'd, 377 F.3d 449
(4th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1300 (2005).
235 Fritschle, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 508 n.21; see also Steinberg v. Weast, 132 F. Supp. 2d 343,
346-47 & nn. 5-6 (D. Md. 2001); Brian S., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 539 n.1.
236 Weast, 377 F.3d at 450.
237 Schaffer, 125 S. Ct. 1300.
238 Brian S., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
239 Brian S., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 540 (quoting ALJ's decision, p. 29).
240 Id. at 540-41.
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Brian's parents filed a complaint in federal court.2 4 1 On cross motions
for summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of Brian's parents.242 The court
assigned the burden of proof to the school district, at least in cases in which
there is a dispute concerning a child's initial placement.243 The court remanded
the case to the ALJ for reconsideration of the case using what it considered to be
the proper burden of proof.
244
The school appealed.245 While the appeal was pending, the AU allo-
cated the burden of proof to the school and issued a revised decision that was
partially favorable to the parents.246 Taking notice of the revised AU decision,
the Fourth Circuit vacated the trial court decision, and remanded the cause to the
trial court "with directions that any issue with respect to the proof scheme in this
case be consolidated with the consideration on the merits. 247
On remand, both parties appealed the AU's partially favorable deci-
sion.248 The trial court, noting that the ALJ applied the burden of proof to the
school, 249 affirmed the decision to award tuition reimbursement; 250 however, it
reversed the decision to partially reimburse the parents.2
After the initial Brian S. decision, the case law in the Fourth Circuit was
somewhat cloudy.252 The clouds cleared (at least for now) on July 29, 2004,
when the Fourth Circuit reversed Brian S.'s favorable judgment.253 In a divided
241 Id. at 539.
242 Id. at 545.
243 Id. In cases where there was a challenge to an existing IEP, the Brian S. court noted that it
would assign the administrative burden of proof to the party making the challenge.
244 Id.
245 Schaffer v. Vance, 2 Fed. App'x 232 (4th Cir. 2001), further proceedings sub nom. Weast v.
Schaffer, 240 F. Supp. 2d 396 (D. Md. 2002), rev'd, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 1300 (2005).
246 2 Fed. App'x at 233. On remand in this tuition reimbursement case, the ALJ awarded the
parents tuition reimbursement, but to a lesser extent than sought by the parents. Weast, 240 F.
Supp. 2d 396 (one-half of a school year, rather than the whole year). This is a somewhat common
disposition of tuition reimbursement disputes. In one out of eight tuition reimbursement cases,
parents receive partially favorable decisions. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 88, at 355.
247 Id.
248 Weast, 240 F. Supp. 2d 396.
249 Id. at 406.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 See Steinberg v. Weast, 132 F. Supp. 2d 343, 346-47 (D. Md. 2001) (assignment of burden
of proof to parents, even if error, was harmless); see also Waller v. Bd. of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 2d
531 (D. Md. 2002) (same); cf Bd. of Educ. v. Michael M., 95 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D. W. Va. 2000)
(school district bore the burden of proof). For a discussion of Michael M., see Osborne, supra
note 10, at 369-71.
253 Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004). For three discussions, see WRIGHT, supra
note 9; Lindsay P. Hembree, Recent Development, Burden of Proof - Weast v. Schaffer: The
Burden of Proof in Proving the Adequacy of Individualized Education Programs, 28 AM. J. TRIAL
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opinion, the Fourth Circuit concluded there was "no valid reason to depart from
the general rule that the party initiating a proceeding has the burden of proof...
,254 Holding "that parents who challenge an JEP have the burden of proof in
the administrative hearing," the Fourth Circuit remanded Brian S.'s case for
further proceedings.
The Fourth Circuit first noted the IDEA's silence regarding the burden
of proof256 and the division of authorities regarding the burden's allocation in
administrative proceedings.257 It then rejected all reasons offered by Brian S.'s
parents in favor of assigning the burden to the school: the remedial nature of the
IDEA, the greater access to expertise and information possessed by school per-
sonnel, and the history of the IDEA. 8 In discussing its result, the Fourth Cir-
cuit observed that placing the burden of proof on the school would be to pre-
sume that all LEPs are inadequate.2 5 9 Further, it stated: "A presumption of in-
adequacy would go against the basic policy of the IDEA, which is to rely on the
professional expertise of local educators. 26°
2. Brian Schaffer and the United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of the United States granted the Schaffers' petition
for writ of certiorari.261 On appeal, nine states and numerous advocacy groups
authored amicus briefs in support of the Schaffers,262 while the States of Alaska,
ADvoc. 259 (2004); Recent Case, Disability Law - Individuals with Disabilities Education Act -
Fourth Circuit Holds That Parents Bear the Burden of Proof in a Due Process Hearing Against a
School District: Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 1078 (2005).
254 Id. at 450. One judge dissented. Id. at 456-59 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
255 Id. at 456.
256 Id. at 452. The Fourth Circuit is only partially correct. The IDEA allocates the burden of
proof in several narrow circumstances, as noted above. See supra Part II.C. The Fourth Circuit's
decision does not account for these express allocations, either by indicating them as exceptions to
the general rule it announced or by indicating whether it considered them as interpretive guides
(See infra Part IV).
257 Weast, 377 F.3d at 452. The Fourth Circuit considered only federal appellate decisions. In
doing so and in not considering state regulations, for example, it considered only a fraction of the
controlling legal authority. For instance, the Fourth Circuit observed: "It is not clear how the D.C.
Circuit would assign the burden in a case.., where only the substance of the IEP is challenged."
Id. at 453. It is not clear that the D.C. Circuit would ever need to make such an assignment, when
that matter is resolved by regulation. See D.C. MUN. REGs. tit. 5, § 3022.16 (2005).
258 Weast, 377 F.3d at 453-55.
259 Id. at 455-56.
260 Id.
261 Schaffer v. Weast, 125 S. Ct. 1300 (2005).
262 WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 3; Amicus Briefs Filed in Schaffer v. Weast, available at
http://www.wrightslaw.com/news/05/schaffer.amicus.states.htm#orgs (last visited July 7, 2005)
(on file with author).
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Hawaii, and Oklahoma supported the District.263 The United States, which sup-
ported the Schaffers in proceedings before the Fourth Circuit, 264 recently an-
nounced it was supporting the District's position before the Supreme Court.26 5
3. An Intra-Circuit Conflict of Law, Post-Schaffer
The Fourth Circuit's most recent decision has created another intra-
circuit division of authority. By regulation, West Virginia allocates the burden
of proof "as to the appropriateness of any proposed action" to the school.2 66
This would include placement disputes, even when the school is proposing a
less restrictive placement.267
F. The Fifth Circuit (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) and the Eleventh
Circuit (Alabama, Florida, and Georgia)
Discussion of the burden-of-proof allocations in these two circuits re-
quires a brief review of their peculiar history. Until October 1, 1981, the states
that form the present Fifth Circuit and the states that form the Eleventh Circuit
formed the original Fifth Circuit.268 On that date, the Circuit was split into two
Circuits.269 Prior to that date, the original Fifth Circuit was divided into two
administrative units: Unit A and Unit B. 270 "A decision of either administrative
unit was binding on both units and became the law of the old Fifth. 271 In the
first case decided by the new Eleventh Circuit, it decided that the decisions of
the original Fifth Circuit "shall be binding as precedent in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.,,272
263 WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 3 n.8.
264 Caroline Hendrie, High Court to Decide Who Must Prove Case in Special Ed. Disputes,
EDUC. WK., Mar. 2, 2005, at 1.
265 WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 3-4; Christina A. Samuels, Switching Sides, U.S. Backs District in
IDEA Case Before Supreme Court, EDUC. WK., June 28, 2005,
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2005/06/28/42schafferweb.h24.htm (on file with author).
266 W. VA. CODER. § 126-16-8.1.1 l(c) (2003).
267 Id. (stating that "school personnel" have the burden of proving why a "more normalized
placement could/could not adequately and appropriately service the individual's educational
needs" (emphasis added)). Additionally, Virginia state courts apparently assume the burden is
bome by school districts. See WEBER, supra note 4, at 22:1 & n.9 (citing Sch. Bd. v. Beasley, 380
S.E.2d 884, 888 (Va. 1989)); WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 19 n.65 (same).
268 Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 th Cir. 1981).
269 Id. at 1207 (citing Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-
452, 94 Stat. 1995).
270 Id. at 1211n.8.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 1207.
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One decision from the original Fifth Circuit addressed burdens of proof.
273In S-1 v. Turlington, a panel of Unit B appeared to provide guidance concern-
ing the burden of proof under the IDEA. The S-1 plaintiffs challenged discipli-
nary suspensions and expulsions, asserting that the misconduct for which they
were disciplined was related to their disabilities.274 Defendants asserted that the
plaintiffs had waived this argument, as none had raised it prior to exclusion.275
The S-1 court considered which party had the burden of raising the issue of
whether a student's misbehavior was a "manifestation" of the student's disabil-
ity: the student or the school.276 In allocating the burden to the school to deter-
mine whether a child's behavior was a manifestation of the child's disability, the
S-1 court noted the Act's "remedial" purpose and further observed "that in most
cases, the handicapped students and their parents lack the wherewithal either to
know or to assert their rights" under the IDEA.277 These two rationales are not
limited to disciplinary exclusions, and seem broad enough to apply to all IDEA
disputes.278 Although S-1 was binding precedent in the new Fifth Circuit279 and
the Eleventh Circuit,280 neither court followed (or even discussed) S-1 in later
burden-allocation cases.281
1. The Fifth Circuit's Path
In the Fifth Circuit, the party challenging the terms of an IEP bears the
burden of proving that the IEP is inappropriate.282 This rule was first announced
in Tatro v. Texas.283 In Tatro, the school initially refused the Tatro family's
request that it provide clean intermittent catheterization (CIC) to their daughter
Amber, who had spina bifida.284 In order for Amber to remain in the placement
provided in the IEP, she needed CIC. The Fifth Circuit stated:
273 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (abrogated on other grounds).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 348.
276 Id. at 348-49.
277 Id. at 349.
278 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 11.
279 The Fifth Circuit encompasses Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
280 The Eleventh Circuit encompasses Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.
281 See, e.g., HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 20 n.154. Query: To what extent does S-1
survive the 2004 IDEA reauthorization, which deleted similar language from the statute? See
supra notes 117-25 (discussing "manifestation determination" law).
282 See Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd on other grounds sub nor. Irving
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); see also Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Michael F., 118 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1997); Salley v. St. Tammany Parrish, 57 F.3d 458 (5th Cir.
1995); Christopher M. v. Corpus Christi Sch. Dist., 933 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1991); Alamo Heights
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1986).
283 703 F.2d 823.
284 Id. at 825.
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We are convinced that the central role of the IEP ... gives rise
to a presumption in favor of the educational placement estab-
lished by [the child's] IEP. Moreover, because the IEP is
jointly developed by the school district and the parents, fairness
requires that the party attacking its terms should bear the burden
of showing why the educational setting established by the IEP
is not appropriate.285
The Tatro court's focus was clearly on the child's agreed-upon placement,
286rather than the other terms sought by the parent. The court placed the burden
on the school to show that the jointly established placement was inappropriate,
"rather than on the parents to show that their child could not benefit from spe-
cial education provided in her home or in an institutional setting where CIC was
already provided.,
287
In Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Educa-
tion,288 the Fifth Circuit cited the above-quoted language from Tatro;289 how-
ever, the court shifted its focus from placement to programming.290 In Alamo
Heights, the parent sought to add extended school year (hereinafter ESY) ser-
vices to a previously adopted IEP. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
order that ESY services be provided.2 9 1 Although it found that the parent had
carried the burden of proof, by shifting its focus from placement to program-
ming, the Fifth Circuit's Alamo Heights burden allocation was arguably di-
vorced from Tatro's underlying rationale: "allocation of [the burden of proof]
on a jointly developed placement to which the school district reneged. 2 92
In subsequent cases, the courts of the Fifth Circuit have consistently ap-
plied the programming emphasis of Alamo Heights rather than the placement
emphasis of Tatro.2 93 The Fifth Circuit's post-Tatro cases have, in the vast ma-
jority of instances, placed the burden on those who challenge the inappropriate-
ness of an IEP, 29 4 including a proposed IEP. 29 5 The Fifth Circuit's burden allo-
cation applies both at the administrative level and in court.296
285 Id. at 830.
286 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 7.
287 Id.
288 790 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1986).
289 Id. at 1158 (citing Tatro, 703 F.2d at 830).
290 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 7.
291 Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d 1153.
292 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 7.
293 See, e.g., Cypress-Fairbanks, 18 F.3d at 247-48; Salley, 57 F.3d at 466; Christopher M.,
933 F.2d at 1290; Grapevine-Colleyville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Danielle R., 31 IDELR 103 (N.D.
Tex. 1999); Swift v. Rapides Pub. Sch. Sys., 812 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. La. 1993).
294 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 17 n.76 (citing Ann V. Lockwood, What the Hearing
Officer Wants to Know in a Special Education Hearing, TEX. SCH. ADMIN. LEG. DIG., Nov. 1992,
at 1, 2). The Fifth Circuit also placed the burden of proving procedural compliance with the
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Finally, two decisions concerning discipline of students with disabilities
from the Fifth Circuit deserve note. In Klein Independent School District, a
Texas hearing officer assigned the burden of proof to the school in a manifesta-
tion determination case, consistent with portions of IDEA '97 that have since
been amended.297 In Colvin ex rel. Colvin v. Lowndes County,298 a Mississippi
federal judge ruled that a parent who seeks the IDEA's protections for a child
who has not been identified as IDEA-eligible has the burden of proving that the
school knew or should have known of the student's disability.
2 99
2. The Eleventh Circuit's Path
In Devine v. Indian River County School Board,3° the Eleventh Circuit
held that the party attacking "an existing IEP' '30 1 bears the burden of proving
that the IEP is inappropriate.3 °2 In doing so, the court rejected the family's re-
quest to adopt the Lascari court's burden allocation. °3 Rather, it relied on the
Fifth Circuit's Christopher M. decision. 304 The Devine court made no reference
to S-I v. Turlington,30 5 which was binding precedent. 306 It is unclear, then,
whether S-i has any force in the Eleventh Circuit outside of the context of stu-
dent discipline. Arguably, it does in instances where the challenge does not
concern an "existing IEP."
The Devine decision supersedes prior federal district court decisions. In
Burger v. Murray County School District,30 7 a Georgia federal judge had placed
the burden of proof on the party seeking to change the existing placement.3°8 InTracey T. v. McDaniel,3 9 a Georgia federal court limited Burger's burden allo-
IDEA, with liability imposed even for a minor procedural violation. See, e.g., Cypress-Fairbanks,
118 F.3d at 248. The 2004 IDEA reauthorization has revised this rule. 20 U.S.C.A. §
1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
295 See, e.g., Salley, 57 F.3d at 466-67; see also Brillon v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 100 Fed.
App'x 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2004).
296 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 17 n.75 & 18 n.92.
297 34 IDELR T 140 (Tex. SEA 2000).
298 114 F. Supp. 2d 504 (N.D. Miss. 1999).
299 Id. at 509 (citing Rodiriecus L. v. Waukegan Sch. Dist. No. 60, 90 F.3d 249, 254 (7th Cir.
1996)).
300 249 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 815 (2002).
301 Id. at 1291.
302 Id. at 1291-92.
303 Id. at 1291 (citing Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1188).
304 Id. at 1291-92 (citing Christopher M., 933 F.2d at 1290-91).
305 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
306 See supra notes 273-81 and accompanying text.
307 612 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
308 Id. at 437.
309 610 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
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cation to administrative proceedings. 310 The Tracey T. court placed the burden
in judicial proceedings on the party challenging the administrative outcome. 311
All three Eleventh Circuit states have state authorities that, to varying
degrees, differ from Devine's burden allocation. Alabama's special education
regulations allocate the "burden of proof' at the administrative level to the
school system.31 2 Georgia's special education regulations provide that LEAs
have, as a general rule, the burden of production and persuasion in administra-
tive proceedings. 313 Georgia's general rule allocating the burden to the school
system is subject to two important exceptions. First, the rule provides that the
family bears the burden of proof when it proposes a placement that is more re-
strictive than the placement "provided by an existing, agreed upon IEP.
314
Second, the rule empowers the presiding officer to "modify and apply these gen-
eral principles to conform with the requirements of law and justice in individual
cases under unique or unusual circumstances as determined by the AU. '3 15
Finally, a Florida hearing officer stated, relying on state rules of administrative
law, that the burden of proof "in an administrative proceeding is on the party
asserting the affirmative of the issue, unless the burden is otherwise established
by statute. 3 16 In this appeal, the issue was reimbursement for an IEE,317 an in-
stance in which the IDEA establishes the burden of proof.31 8 In instances where
the IDEA does not allocate the burden of proof, Florida hearing officers appar-
ently allocate the burden of proof to the party asserting the "affirmative of the
issue, 319 whatever that may be.
As all three states have burden allocations that differ from the Devine
rule, reviewing courts will certainly be confronted with conflicting rules of law.
An Alabama federal judge faced such a situation in Eric J. v. Huntsville City
Board of Education. 32 He attempted to harmonize the Alabama regulation (al-
locating the burden to the schools) with the authorities that place the burden of
310 Id.
311 Id. at 949.
312 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-8-9-.08(8)(c)(6)(ii)(I) (2005).
313 GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 160-4-7.18(1)(g)(8) (2005).
314 Id.
315 Id. (emphasis added). We disapprove of allocating something as fundamental as the burden
of proof on a case-by-case basis. If it is to be used at all, we would suggest that this power to
reallocate the burden of proof be used sparingly, and only in the most extraordinary circum-
stances. Professor McCormick considered a rule whereby the fact-finder could determine the
burden of proof on an ad hoc basis to be "most undesirable." 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 336, at
509.
316 Broward County Sch. Bd., 35 IDELR 117, at 444 (Fla. SEA 2001).
317 Id.
318 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
319 Broward County Sch. Bd., 35 IDELR 117, at 444.
320 22 IDELR 858, 867-68 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
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proof on a party challenging the administrative outcome.321 The court con-
cluded that the school had the burden of proof at the hearing and the parents,
who were challenging the adverse administrative decision, had the burden of
proof in district court.32 The Eric J. burden allocation, at least as far as it con-
cerns judicial review, has been superseded by Devine. Nevertheless, the case
illustrates the dilemma that reviewing courts may face in the Eleventh Circuit.
G. The Sixth Circuit: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee
The Sixth Circuit allocates the burden of proof to the party challenging
the child's jointly developed IEP.323 This burden applies in both administrative
and judicial proceedings.324 In Doe v. Defendant I, relying on Tatro, the Sixth
Circuit first announced this rule.325 It did so without discussing prior Sixth Cir-
cuit decisions that had allocated the burden of proof to the litigant who is chal-
lenging the administrative outcome.326
In Doe, Renner v. Board of Education, and Cordrey v.Euckert, the par-
ents were challenging the terms or implementation of an adopted LEP.327 In Doe
v. Board of Education of Tullahoma City Schools,328 however, the Sixth Circuit
dealt with a case with a slight but crucially important difference: the IEP was
merely proposed, not adopted. In the fall of 1989, John Doe, a student in the
Tullahoma school system, notwithstanding an IQ of 130, was identified as an
individual with a disability because of "a neurological impairment that hinders
his ability to process auditory information and engage in normal language and
thinking skills. 329 In May 1990, John's IEP team decided that an IEP would be
developed after John selected courses for the coming school year.330 During the
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 2000); Renner v. Bd. of
Educ., 185 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1993);
Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1466 (6th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186,
1191 (6th Cir. 1990); Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton County Dep't of Educ., 259 F. Supp. 2d 687,
697 (E.D. Tenn. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 392 F.3d 840, 854 (6th Cir. 2004); Brimmer v.
Traverse City Area Pub. Schs., 872 F. Supp. 447, 449 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
324 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 13.
325 898 F.2d at 1191 (citing Tatro, 703 F.2d at 830).
326 Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1341 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d
884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); Barwacz v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., 674 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (W.D.
Mich. 1987).
327 Renner, 185 F.3d 635 (parent's proposal to increase amount of discrete trial training for a
student with autism); Cordrey, 917 F.2d 1460 (parent's request for addition of ESY to extant
IEP); Defendant 1, 898 F.2d 1186 (where IEP provided for tutoring and testing, parent's rejection
of tutoring and testing offered by school and request for reimbursement).
328 9 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 1993).
329 Id. at 456.
330 Id.
39
Mayes et al.: Allocating the urden of Proof in Administrative and Judicial Pro
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
summer of 1990, John's parents requested that Tullahoma provide funding for
John to attend a private school for children with learning disabilities in Carbon-
dale, Illinois. 33' After the IEP team refused to provide funding, the parents en-
rolled John in the Carbondale school and requested tuition reimbursement. 332 In
his absence, the school chose courses for John, and the IEP team developed an
IEP.3 33 "The school system's proposed IEP rejected the parents' assertion that
the [Carbondale school] was the only appropriate placement., 334 An ALJ ruled
that the school's proposed placement was appropriate, and a federal court
agreed.335 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held, inter alia, that the parents, as the
parties challenging "the IEP devised by [the school], 3 36 had the burden of
proof.
337
The Tullahoma case was a subtle but dramatic reallocation of the bur-
den of proof. It has been followed in other cases in the Sixth Circuit;338 how-
ever, one Ohio State Level Review Officer declined to follow Tullahoma in
Huntington Local School District.339 In that case, the school district sought a
due process hearing after the parent rejected an IEP that provided a more restric-
tive placement. 340 The hearing officer specifically placed the burden on the
district, noting two factors: the district requested the IEP meeting and the dis-
pute concerned a "proposed" IEP.
34 1
Finally, a first-tier hearing officer addressed the interaction of the Sixth
Circuit's judicial gap-filling and Congress's specific allocations of the burden of
proof in "manifestation determination" cases.342 The hearing officer rejected the
school's argument based on the Cordrey line of cases for several reasons, the
331 Id.
332 Id. at 456-57.
333 Id. at 457.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id. at 458.
337 Id.
338 See, e.g., Kenton County Sch. Dist. v. Hunt, 384 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2004); Dong v. Bd. of
Educ., 197 F.3d 793, 799-800 (6th Cir. 1999); Bd. of Educ. v. Patrick M., 9 F. Supp. 2d 811, 820
(N.D. Ohio 1998). The Dong case adds additional confusion to the burden-of-proof issue in the
Sixth Circuit. In addition to citing Sixth Circuit cases, the Dong court cited Clyde K. v. Puyallup
School District, 35 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994). In Clyde K., the Ninth Circuit placed the burden of
proof at the judicial phase upon the party challenging the administrative outcome. 35 F.3d at
1398-99. The Clyde K. burden allocation is quite different from the Doe v. Defendant I allocation,
and is in line with an earlier line of Sixth Circuit cases that address the burden of proof. See supra
notes 323-37 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the Sixth Circuit's burden allo-
cation).
339 39 IDELR 210 (Ohio SEA 2003).
310 Id.
341 Id. at 2056.
342 Bd. of Educ. of Perry Pub. Schs., 39 IDELR 251 (Mich. SEA 2003).
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most important of which is that the plain language of the regulations allocates
the burden to the schools.343
H. The Seventh Circuit: Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin
In Board of Education of School District No. 21 v. Illinois State Board
of Education,34 the Seventh Circuit assigned the burden of proof to the plaintiff
in federal district court. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit did not offer a ration-
ale.345 Additionally, the School District 21 court cited Second Circuit and Sixth
Circuit cases in support of its burden allocation;346 however, neither authority
cited by the Court concerned burden of proof.347 Rather, both cases concerned
scope of review, as opposed to burden of proof.
348
It is less clear who bears the burden of proof before administrative
agencies. A federal judge noted that no Seventh Circuit case had addressed the
question; however, the court found it unnecessary to answer, as it would not
have been outcome-determinative. 349 By statute, Illinois assigns a modest bur-
den to the school district.350 Indiana assigns the burden of proof to the party
requesting the due process hearing.35' A federal district court assigned the bur-
den of proof to a school district in Richland School District v. Thomas P.;352
however, this case concerned burden of proof in a case involving a manifesta-
343 Id. at 2204. The other reasons deserve note. First, the hearing officer noted that the regula-
tions post-dated the Cordrey opinion. Second, the hearing officer noted that the Cordrey line of
cases did not deal with discipline disputes. Id.
344 Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 21 v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712, 716
(7th Cir. 1991); see Bd. of Educ. of Murphysboro Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 186 v. Ill. State Bd.
of Educ., 41 F.3d 1162, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing and following School District No. 21); see
also Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 221, 375 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2004);
Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 65 v. Michael M., 356 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2004); Heather
S. v. Wis., 125 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1997); Keith H. v. Janesville Sch. Dist., 305 F. Supp. 2d 986,
998 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
345 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 9 (discussing School District 21).
346 School District 21, 938 F.2d at 716.
347 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 9.
348 Id.
349 T.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 55 F. Supp. 2d 830, 835 (N.D. Ill. 1999). One text seemingly asserts
that the school has the burden of proof in administrative hearings; see GERSTEIN & GERSTEIN,
supra note 10, at 250 n.39 (citing Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2002)); however,
the case at issue was applying an Illinois statute and does not necessarily indicate the standard for
the entire Seventh Circuit.
350 Beth B. v. Van Clay, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1028 (N.D. I1. 2001) (citing 105 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/14-8.02), aff'd, 282 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2002).
351 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-30-3(r)(2005).
352 32 IDELR 233 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
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tion determination review,353 an area of law affected by the 2004 IDEA reau-
thorization.354
L. The Eighth Circuit: Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, and South Dakota
1. The Eighth Circuit's Pronouncements
In E.S. v. Independent School District 196, the Eighth Circuit placed
the burden of proof on schools in administrative proceedings; in judicial pro-
ceedings, the burden of proof is placed upon the party challenging the adminis-
trative outcome. In assigning the burden to schools at the administrative stage,
the E.S. court relied on a Ninth Circuit case356 rather than a Minnesota regula-
tion assigning the burden in the same manner.357 The Eighth Circuit, however,
confirmed its assignment of administrative burden of proof in Blackmon v.
Springfield R-XII School District.
358
2. State Law in the Eighth Circuit
As noted above,359 Minnesota assigns the burden of proof to the
school. 360 However, Minnesota requires the parents to assume the burden of
proof when they seek tuition reimbursement.361 At least three Eighth Circuit
states have administrative rules allocating the burden of proof, at least at the
administrative level, that may appear to conflict with the E.S./Blackmon rule.
Arkansas (since 1993), Iowa, and Nebraska place the burden of production on
353 Id.; see also Zirkel, supra note 118 (discussing Thomas P.).
354 See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
355 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998). For federal district court cases from the Eighth Circuit,
prior to E.S., assigning the burden of proof to the party challenging the administrative outcome,
see Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 900 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 (D.S.D. 1995), aff'd (as modified)
on other grounds, 93 F.3d 1369 (8th Cir. 1996); Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Mo. State Bd. of
Educ., 923 F. Supp. 1216, 1229 (E.D. Mo. 1996), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ft. Zumwalt
Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 1997).
356 E.S., 135 F.2d at 569 (citing Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398-99
(9th Cir. 1994)).
357 MINN. R. 3525.3900(F) (2001); see also Indep. Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR 44 (Minn. SEA
1999) (applying regulation); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 31 IDELR 174 (Minn. SEA 1999) (same).
358 198 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir. 1999).
359 See supra note 357.
360 See supra note 357; see also MINN. STAT. § 125A.091, subdiv. 16 (2005).
361 MINN. STAT. § 125A.091, subdiv. 16.
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the party initiating the administrative action.362 Prior to the change in 1993,
Arkansas regulations placed the burden of proof on the school district.
363
Finally, South Dakota has administrative regulations that provide that
schools have the burden of proof in actions for injunctive relief under Honig v.
Doe,364 where the school seeks the suspension or expulsion of a student with
disabilities. 365 These regulations do not grant students much additional protec-
tion for, as a general rule, persons seeking injunctive relief always have the bur-
den of proof.
366
J. The Ninth Circuit: Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, and Washington
1. The Ninth Circuit Speaks
In Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District No. 3,367 the Ninth Circuit as-
signed the burden of proof to schools in administrative proceedings and to the
party attacking the outcome of the administrative proceedings in court.368 Rely-
ing on Oberti, the Clyde K. plaintiffs requested that the Ninth Circuit assign the
burden of proof to the school district in court, regardless of the administrative
outcome. 369 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating:
We note, however, that merely because a statute confers sub-
stantive rights on a favored group does not mean the group is
also entitled to receive every procedural advantage. Absent
clear statutory language to the contrary, procedural questions
are resolved by neutral principles that are independent of any
362 ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING SPECIAL EDUCATION AND
RELATED SERVICES: PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAM STANDARDS § 10.01.28 (2000);
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-41.117 (2001); 92 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 55-007.01A (2002).
363 Streett, supra note 10, at 42.
364 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
365 S.D. ADMIN. R. 24:05:26:13 (2002) (suspension); Id. R. 24:05:26.01:12 (expulsion).
366 See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 238 (1932); Guar. Trust Co.
v. Henwood, 86 F.2d 347, 354 (8th Cir. 1936); Gross v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 361 N.W.2d
259, 265 (S.D. 1985).
367 35 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994). For further information on Clyde K., see McCarthy, supra
note 74; Mitchell L. Yell, Clyde K. and Sheila K. v. Puyallup School District: The Courts, Inclu-
sion, and Students with Behavioral Disorders, 20 BEHAV. DISORDERS 179 (1995); Perry A. Zirkel
& Ivan B. Gluckman, "Full Inclusion" of Students with Disabilities, Part 2, NASSP BULL., Sept.
1996, at 91.
368 35 F.3d at 1398-99; see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1498 (9th Cir.
1996) (burden of proof in district court was on school, as party challenging the administrative
outcome); Everett v. Santa Barbara High Sch., 32 IDELR 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (hearing officer
erred in placing burden of proof on parents).
369 Clyde K, 35 F.3d at 1398-99 (citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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particular statute's substantive policy objectives. Allocation of
the burden of proof has long been governed by the rule that the
party bringing the lawsuit must persuade the court to grant the
requested relief. Because we find nothing in the IDEA suggest-
ing that a contrary standard should apply here, we join the sub-
stantial majority of the circuits that have addressed this issue by
placing the burden of proof on the party challenging the admin-
istrative ruling.37°
In Clyde K., the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt prior allocations of the
burden of proof in judicial proceedings by lower federal courts. Two earlier
decisions from lower courts in the Ninth Circuit had assigned the burden of
proof in court actions to the party seeking the more restrictive placement.37'
Another lower court assigned the burden of proof to the parents, although it was
unclear whether the court assigned the burden to the parents as parents or to the
parents as the party attacking the administrative results.372
2. State Law in the Ninth Circuit
At the administrative level, Alaska places the burden of proof on the
LEA.373 Montana places the burden of production on the party requesting the
hearing.374 A Nevada hearing officer placed the burden of proof upon the
child's guardian to prove that the child's residence was in Nevada, where the
child's guardian unilaterally placed the child in a New York private school.375
An Oregon regulation provides that, when the state Department of Education
decides to withhold funding or recoup funds from a local school district for vio-
lations of the IDEA, the local district may request an administrative hearing.376
If the proposed sanction is challenged and a hearing requested, "the burden of
proof ... is on the Department., 377 Finally, the Montana organization supervis-
ing interscholastic athletics has a rule stating that high school athletes with dis-
370 Id. at 1399 (citing Roland M., Kerkam, and Spielberg).
371 See Sacramento Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Harmon
v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 17 EHLR 1029 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
372 Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No 7J, 766 F. Supp. 852, 863 (D. Or. 1991), aft'd, 980 F.2d
585 (9th Cir. 1992). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not specifically address the "burden of
proof' issue.
373 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(e)(9) (2003).
374 MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3521(1) (2001).
375 Washoe County Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 569 (Nev. SEA 1998). The hearing officer ruled that
the child was not a resident of Nevada, and the review officer affirmed.
376 OR. ADMIN. R. 581-015-0054 (2001).
377 Id. R. 581-015-0054(15)(c). For more information on SEA supervision of local school
districts, see Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 56, at 67-74.
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abilities under the IDEA and Section 504 who seek a waiver of the organiza-
tion's age limits have the burden of proving that they are entitled to a waiver.
378
K. The Tenth Circuit: Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah,
and Wyoming
In Johnson v. Independent School District No. 4,379 the Tenth Circuit al-
located the burden of proof to the "party attacking the child's individual educa-
tion plan. 38 ° In doing so, the Tenth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's Alamo
Heights rule.381 Johnson involved a family's request to add ESY services to an
existing IEP.382 The court held the trial court used the incorrect legal standard
and remanded. 383 The Johnson rule applies to both administrative and judicial
proceedings .384
Like the Sixth Circuit,385 the courts and hearing officers in the Tenth
Circuit have encountered difficulty in applying its rule. Citing Johnson, a Utah
federal district court allocated the burden of proof to the party challenging the
administrative outcome.386 This, however, is not the holding of Johnson and is
not the law of the Tenth Circuit.387 In Urban v. Jefferson County School District
R-l ,3 a Colorado federal district judge did not cite Johnson but stated that, in
determining the burden of proof, the nature of the challenge to the IEP must be
determined. Where a change in the IEP is sought, "the burden of showing that
the placement is 'appropriate' rests with the school district" whereas "where the
issue is whether the IEP is appropriate," the burden rests with the parents to
prove that it is inappropriate. 389 The court seemed to be distinguishing chal-
378 M.H. v. Montana High Sch. Ass'n, 929 P.2d 239, 242 (Mont. 1996) (citing rule in deciding
a § 504 claim). See generally Adam A. Milani, Can I Play?: The Dilemma of the Disabled Ath-
lete in Interscholastic Sports, 49 ALA. L. REv. 817 (1998); Kathleen A. Sullivan et al., Leveling
the Playing Field or Leveling the Players? Section 504, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
Interscholastic Sports, 33 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 258 (2000).
379 921 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1990).
380 Id. at 1026. See also Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 107 F.3d 797, 807 n.10 (10th
Cir.), vacated, 521 U.S. 1115 (1997) (citing Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1026, and HUEFNER & ZiRKEL,
supra note 10); A.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 25, 936 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1991).
381 921 F.2d at 1026 (citing Alamo Heights).
382 Id.
383 Id.
384 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 13.
385 See supra Part II.G.
386 L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1180 (D. Utah 2002), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1026).
387 See supra notes 379-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's burden-of-
proof allocation).
388 870 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Colo. 1994), affd, 89 F.3d 720 (10th Cir. 1996).
389 870 F. Supp. at 1566.
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lenges to a current IEP placement from challenges to the IEP itself. In making
this distinction, the court cited the Third Circuit's Fuhrmann decision for the
placement burden3 90 and Sixth Circuit cases for the programming burden.39'
Then, it proceeded to cite Seventh Circuit authority in concluding that the par-
ents bore the burden as the parties challenging the administrative outcome.392
There is also some dispute in the Tenth Circuit, at least at the hearing
officer level, concerning what party bears the burden of proof when a proposed
IEP, as opposed to an existing IEP, is being attacked. A Colorado hearing offi-
cer allocated the burden to the parents when they attack an IEP proposed by a
school,393 but noted that other Colorado hearing officers had ruled differently.394
In a prior case, a Colorado hearing officer placed the burden of proof on the
school in a dispute over an IEP that had not been approved by the parents.395
IV. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION
The preceding discussion reveals that confusion reigns over the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. The jurisdictions are badly divided, and several
jurisdictions have internal conflicts as well. In several jurisdictions, hearing
officers must apply law, which is, at best, inconsistent and is, at worst, contra-
dictory. This uncertain state of affairs provides no help to parents and school
personnel. A change is in order.
In this section, we propose that schools bear the burden of proof at all
stages and for all issues, regardless of which side initiated the action. As an
exception to this general rule, we propose that parents be required to prove the
appropriateness of a private, unilateral placement before a school would be re-
quired to pay tuition reimbursement to the parents. Our proposal, which is sup-
ported by the statutory language and by consideration of policy, is most consis-
tent with the burden allocation adopted by the Second Circuit.
396
390 Id. at 1566 (citing Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1035).
391 Id. (citing Doe, 9 F.3d at 458; Cordrey, 917 F.2d at 1469).
392 Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. I11. St. Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1991). The Ur-
ban district court's discussion of burden of proof was not germane to its primary legal ruling that
IDEA contains no legal entitlement to a neighborhood school placement. Burden of proof was not
an issue on appeal. Urban, 89 F.3d 720.
393 Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 39 IDELR 173 (Colo. SEA 2003).
394 Id.
395 Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 35 IDELR 1295 (Colo. SEA 2001).
396 See supra Part III.C (discussing the Second Circuit's burden allocation).
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A. Administrative Hearings
1. Reasons Supporting the Preferred Allocation
Of all of the approaches to allocating the burden of proof at the adminis-
trative level, the preferred approach is to assign the burden to the school, regard-
less of which party requested the due process hearing. This approach has been
adopted by a notable number of judicial and administrative authorities,397 as
well as several commentators.398
First, this approach coheres with Congress's and the United States De-
partment of Education's explicit allocations of the burden in certain cases. The
IDEA and its implementing regulations assign the burden of proof to LEAs in
disputes concerning independent educational evaluations,399 changes to a child's
placement or programming when the child is convicted of an adult crime and
confined to an adult prison,4°° and until recently, common disciplinary issues
(such as manifestation determinations and removals to interim alternate educa-
tional settings). 401 Given the fact that the IDEA expressly allocates the burden
of proof to LEAs in such a fundamental matter as evaluation and such a contro-
versial matter as corrections education, 402 it makes perfect sense to allocate the
burden of proof to LEAs in other matters .4 3 As noted by one legal encyclope-
dia, "different parts of a statute reflect light upon each other."4°4 The IDEA's
express provisions concerning discipline and evaluation illuminate the issue of
which party should bear the burden of proof in other, unspecified contexts. By
expressly imposing the burden on LEAs when these two elementary issues are
397 See, e.g., supra Parts III.A, III.C, IlI.D, 111.1, and IllI.J.
398 See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 9; Huefner, supra note 65, at 510-13; Anstaett, supra note 10,
at 770-72; William N. Myhill, Note, No FAPE For Children with Disabilities in the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program: Time to Redefine a Free Appropriate Public Education, 89 IOWA L.
REv. 1051, 1078-83 (2004); Recent Case, supra note 253, at 1084-85; cf Guernsey, supra note 9,
at 71-77 (while proposing the allocation of the burden of proof on substantive to the party propos-
ing a change in the status quo, proposing that school districts should be required to prove proce-
dural compliance).
399 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text; see also HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10,
at 14 n. 17 (stating lEE regulations are "probative" concerning the overall allocation of the burden
of proof).
4W See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
401 See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
402 See, e.g., Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 127, at 138-39.
403 See Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the United States, in INTERPRETING
STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 407, 413-14, 422, 441 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S.
Summers eds., 1991); see also Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 80, at 464-66 (statutory language must
be read in context); see also Brief for Petitioner at 22-29, Schaffer v. Weast, No. 04-698 (U.S.
Apr. 29, 2005); contra Brief for Respondent at 22-28, Schaffer v. Weast, No. 04-698 (U.S. June
24, 2005).
404 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 105 (1964).
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in dispute, Congress has provided the clearest guidance to courts and regulatory
bodies on how to fill the statutory gap. 45
Second, schools are more likely to have access to information and evi-
dence concerning a child with a disability. 4°6 The child's educational records
are in the possession and control of the school.4° School personnel will pre-
sumably have the expertise to interpret those records, classroom observations,
and standardized test results.4°8 School personnel are also more likely to have
the expertise necessary to develop a program for a child with a disability,
40 9
including expertise in or awareness of special education law.410 LEAs are also
more likely to have access to expert witnesses, such as outside consultants, than
parents.4 1 Under general principles of evidence, the burden of proof may be
reallocated to the party with easier access to evidence.412
Although this consideration is "seldom the controlling factor" in burden
allocations,413 ready availability of evidence is a key rationale for allocating the
burden of proof to the school district, regardless of which party requests the
hearing.414 In fact, these factors were noted by commentators prior to the
405 Others may argue Congress's express allocation of the burden of proof in only these con-
texts may implicate a common rule of statutory construction: "expressio unius exlusio alterius
(mention of one excludes another)." See Summers, supra note 403, at 418. In this particular
problem of statutory construction, this canon does not provide much assistance. Courts, hearing
officers, and regulatory drafters have formulated an impressive variety of burden allocations. If
the burden of proof in IDEA cases were an "either/or" question, then this canon might be informa-
tive; however, there are more than two ways to allocate the burden of proof in special education
disputes. An "either/or" construction insufficiently describes the variety of burden allocations.
As it is, the multiplicity of possible burden allocations greatly reduces the guidance offered by this
particular canon.
406 Huefner, supra note 65, at 511; Kirp et al., supra note 77, at 136; Anstaett, supra note 10, at
772; Myhill, supra note 398, at 1080; Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993)
(citing Lascari v. Bd. of Educ., 560 A.2d 1180, 1188 (N.J. 1989); see also Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 403, at 39-45; but see Brief for Respondent, supra note 403, at 40-43.
407 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000) (the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, also
known as FERPA); Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 80 (discussing relationship between IDEA and
FERPA).
408 Kirp et al., supra note 77, at 136.
409 See, e.g., Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219; Huefner, supra note 65, at 511; Marchese, supra note 3,
at 343; Osborne, supra note 10, at 368-69; Myhill, supra note 398, at 1080.
410 Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1188; Marchese, supra note 3, at 343; Tom E. C. Smith, Status of Due
Process Hearings, 48 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 232, 235 (1981).
411 Smith, supra note 410, at 235.
412 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 337; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2486; WRIGHT, supra note 9,
at 33-35 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) and Concrete Pipe
& Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993)).
413 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 337.
414 See, e.g., Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 453-54 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing these provi-
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IDEA's enactment as justifications for placing the burden of proof in special
education disputes on schools.41 5  Although the IDEA does provide several
means by which parents may access information about their children and their
rights under the IDEA,4 16 and assuming that schools comply with those re-
quirements,41 7 schools remain far more able to apply, interpret, and present that
information. In many instances, information about alternative solutions or out-
comes is simply not available to parents.1 8 In other instances, the information
made available to the parents is viewed solely through the interpretive lens pro-
vided by the school,41 9 if any interpretation or explanation is provided at all.
420
While some authors argue teachers "may have greater unbiased knowledge than
parents, 'A2l this is not often the case. Teachers and other service providers
"have interests that may diverge from those of the children they purportedly
,,422represent. As noted by Professor Kotler:
Of equal importance in limiting parental participation, however,
is a strong resentment by educators of the parental right and
power under the Act to challenge the educators' professional
judgment. The educators' response has often been to seek con-
sciously to circumvent the principle of parental involvement
which underlines the Act.423
415 Kirp et al., supra note 77, at 136.
416 See, e.g., Weast, 377 F.3d at 453-54; see also Guernsey, supra note 9, at 74-77. One par-
ticular protection cited by the Weast court, the written notice of procedural safeguards, is particu-
larly interesting. The notice must be understandable to parents yet legally accurate, a combination
that is "easier said than done." Huefner, supra note 80, at 445. The empirical research bears this
out. One study found that 61 % of parents entitled to notices of IDEA's procedural safeguards
"knew little or nothing about their rights." Martin et al., supra note 51, at 31.
417 See, e.g., Goldberg & Kuriloff, supra note 18, at 550 (Nearly one-quarter of parents (24 %)
studied received "no or nearly no" information, and only another quarter (24 %) received "all or
nearly all" information.).
418 See, e.g., Claire M. Choutka, Experiencing the Reality of Service Delivery: One Parent's
Perspective, 24 J. ASS'N PERSONS SEVERE HANDICAPs 213 (1999); Huefner, supra note 65, at 511
& n.106; Kotler, supra note 70, at 361-73; Rand E. Rosenblatt, Equality, Entitlement, and Na-
tional Health Care Reform: The Challenge of Managed Competition and Managed Care, 60
BROOK. L. REV. 105, 137-38 (1994).
419 See supra note 418; see also Daniel, supra note 80.
420 See, e.g., Goldberg & Kuriloff, supra note 18, at 550 ("More disturbing was a claim by over
half of the parents (51 %) that schools provided no or almost no explanations of the meaning of
whatever records were provided.").
421 Bryant, supra note 74, at 113.
422 Rachel F. Moran, Review Essay, Reflections on the Enigma of Indeterminacy in Child-
Advocacy Cases, 74 CAL. L. REv. 603, 614 (1986).
423 Kotler, supra note 70, at 366; see Marchese, supra note 3, at 343-44 (stating that educators
may not trust parental input, viewing it as not "objective"); see also Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995
F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (similar, citing David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with
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Furthermore, parents of children involved in education and welfare disputes
may be "frequently disorganized and unable to effectively represent their chil-
dren's interests," while teachers and other service providers "are usually highly
organized. ' 24 Although an information imbalance is not itself grounds to real-
locate the burden, the sheer magnitude of the imbalance is a convincing ration-
ale.425
Third, the history of special education law prior to the enactment of the
IDEA supports this allocation. To those who use them,426 statutes' historical
antecedents are crucial interpretive aids.4 27  The IDEA was grounded on the
principles of cases seeking educational access for children with disabilities, 8
such as PARC v. Commonwealth429 and Mills v. Board of Education.430  The
Supreme Court, in Rowley, noted that these cases "established ... the principles
Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 187-
94).
424 Moran, supra note 422, at 614. In support of its claim that the IDEA's procedural safe-
guards adequately level the playing field for parents, the District points to the requirement im-
posed by the IDEA regulations that parents be notified of free or reduced-cost legal assistance
available to them. See Hendrie, supra note 264 (summarizing District's brief in opposition to
petition for certiorari). This is problematic for two reasons. First, there is no guarantee that such
resources are available in all areas. Second, there is no guarantee that, even if such resources exist
nearby, the parents will receive any help due to the limited resources (available staff, travel
budget, etc.) and multiple priorities (domestic abuse, housing and homelessness, etc.) characteris-
tic of many civil legal aid offices (The lead author of this Article spent seven years as a civil legal
aid attorney in Waterloo, Iowa.). For more information, see Marie A. Failinger & Larry May,
Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1984);
Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
531 (1994). See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 403, at 45-50 (stating there is no level play-
ing field in IDEA disputes).
425 Concern about information imbalance should be greater in communities that are not middle-
class or wealthy, as parents in less advantaged communities often "tend to accept what the school
district offers due to their respect for its expertise, intimidation by its authority, or ignorance of
their rights." Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons from Special Education
Legislation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 781-82 (2001); see also Rosenblatt, supra note 418, at
138. In fact, those who support the Fourth Circuit's Weast decision argue that parents are sophis-
ticated advocates for their children. See, e.g., Letter from Jack D. Dale, Superintendent, Fairfax
County Public Schools, to Judith W. Jagdmann, Virginia Attorney General (Apr. 25, 2005) (on
file with author). While the Schaffers may be effective advocates for their child, the Weast dissent
notes they are "not typical." See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 458-59 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig,
J., dissenting). This point is supported by the empirical research. See supra notes 416-24.
426 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing use of many common interpretive aids is inappropriate).
427 Summers, supra note 403, at 426-27.
428 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 10-19;
Martin et al., supra note 51, at 26-28 (discussing predecessors to the IDEA); Buss, supra note 33,
at 301-303 (discussing PARC and Mills).
429 PARC v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
430 Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
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which, to a significant extent, guided the drafters of the Act. 'A31 Notably, Mills
assigns the burden of proof to the LEA,432 and PARC assigns a modest burden of
production to the school. 43 3 In addition, pre-IDEA commentary recommends
assigning the burden of proof to LEAs, 434 and such commentary offers a valu-
able interpretive aid.435 This considerable pre-IDEA history provides further
support for allocating the burden of proof to LEAs.4 36 This argument is
strengthened when one recalls that PARC, Mills, and other pre-IDEA court ac-
tions were not grounded solely on notions of educational policy; rather, they
were suits to vindicate constitutional rights.437 To the extent that allocating the
burden of proof to the schools is a constitutional requirement rather than a pol-
icy choice, the pre-IDEA cases provide even greater support for our preferred
allocation,438 especially when one considers the maxim that statutes are to be
construed to avoid constitutional questions.
439
Fourth, other related issues of fairness weigh in favor of assigning the
burden to school officials. While fairness is one justification for assigning the
burden of proof to the party who is an assertion's proponent, 440 fairness is often
the reason why the burden is reallocated. 44' This consideration is particularly
relevant in special education disputes. Parents, rightly or wrongly, often believe
that the "deck is stacked against them" in due process hearings and on judicial
review." 2 Parents holding this view come to "distrust ' 3 the due process hear-
431 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
432 348 F. Supp. at 881; see also Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135, 142 (E.D. La. 1973).
433 PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 305.
434 Kirp et al., supra note 77, at 136-37.
435 Summers, supra note 403, at 418, 429,443.
436 This argument may cut both ways. As noted by the Fourth Circuit, Congress borrowed
many principles from PARC and Mills, but did not include a provision on burden of proof. Weast
v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 454-55 (4th Cir. 2004). From this, the Fourth Circuit inferred that
Congress did not intend to alter the traditional allocation of the burden of proof. Id. In response,
it is important to note that this argument from historical underpinnings is only one basis for our
preferred allocation. It does, however, provide an important clue as to the proper allocation.
437 See, e.g., Buss, supra note 33; Martin et al., supra note 51, at 28; Mead, supra note 79, at
480.
438 To the extent that the pre-IDEA cases announce a constitutional rule, the Weast rationale,
377 F.3d. at 454-55, is weakened. See supra note 437; see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(6) (West
2000 & Supp. 2005) (Congressional finding that the IDEA is necessary "to ensure equal protec-
tion of the law").
439 See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 7 (1993); Mayes & Zirkel,
supra note 80, at 476-78; Summers, supra note 403, at 417, 451.
44 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 337.
441 Id.; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2486; WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 29-30.
442 See, e.g., Goldberg & Kuriloff, supra note 18; Kuriloff & Goldberg, supra note 3; Zirkel,
Revisions, supra note 18, at 406-07; see also Buss, supra note 33, at 308 (stating "that due process
requires not only fairness in fact but the appearance of fairness" (emphasis added)).
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ing system in particular and the school system in general. This lack of trust may
cause parents to become disengaged from their children's education, with con-
tinuing negative effects.444 Trust is essential to a healthy organization, 45 and to
schools in particular.446 Moreover, parental involvement is crucial to educa-
tional success in general," 7 and critical to the success of students with disabili-
ties.448 For instance, teachers often state that parental involvement is the most
important change needed to improve schools, and state that lack of parental in-
volvement is one of the major barriers to effective school reform. 449 Further-
more, lack of parental involvement and support is "significantly related" to an
intention of new special education teachers to leave the field.450 Distrust may
actually lead to litigation.45' Where trust is lacking, the challenge is to restore or
create "rapport" between parents and school officials.452 To foster increased
parental trust in the system, promote parental involvement, and hopefully reduce
the incidence of litigation, 453 courts and policy-makers should consider allocat-
443 Zirkel, Revisions, supra note 18, at 414; see also Kotler, supra note 70, at 371 (describing
sources of "miscommunication and deception" by some special educators); see generally RICHARD
A. SCHMUCK ET AL., THE SECOND HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT IN SCHOOLS 91
(1977) (defining trust as "the knowledge that the other person will not take unfair advantage of
one, either deliberately or accidentally, consciously or unconsciously" (emphasis added)).
444 See, e.g., STEVEN R. COVEY, THE SEVEN HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE 220 (1989)
("[W]ithout trust, we lack the credibility for open, mutual learning and communication and real
creativity.").
445 See, e.g., id. at 178, 220, 270, 424 (noting the importance of trust to "optimal outcomes");
SCHMUCK ET AL., supra note 443, at 91-92; Robert Hogan et al., What We Know About Leader-
ship: Effectiveness and Personality, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 493, 495, 499 (1994) (noting the im-
portance of trust to effective leadership)..
446 BARRY RUTHERFORD ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PARENT AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
IN EDUCATION 10 (1997) (noting harms from "mutual mistrust"); SCHMUCK ET AL., supra note 443,
at 91-92; Michael Fullan, The Three Stories of Education Reform, 81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 581, 582
(2000) ("When parents, the community, the teachers, and the students share a rapport, learning
occurs.").
447 See, e.g., CAROL GESTWICKi, HOME, SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS (5th ed. 2004);
Daniel, supra note 80, at 3; see also SCHMUCK ET AL., supra note 443, at 394, 448-56.
448 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(B) (2000) (congressional finding); GESTWICKI, supra note
447, at 529-40; Huefner, supra note 65, at 486; Donna L. Terman et al., Special Education for
Students with Disabilities: Analysis and Recommendations, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring
1996, at 4, 15 (noting that parents "are the primary repository of information about the child's
medical condition, academic history, behavioral patterns, and responses to previous interven-
tions").
449 Carol A. Langdon & Nick Vesper, The Sixth Phi Delta Kappa Poll of Teachers' Attitudes
toward Public Schools, 81 PHm DELTA KAPPAN 607, 609 (2000).
450 Nancy L. George et al., To Leave or to Stay? An Exploratory Study of Teachers of Students
with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 16 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 227, 233 (1995).
451 See, e.g., COVEY, supra note 444, at 280.
452 Fullan, supra note 446, at 582.
453 See, e.g., Zirkel & D'Angelo, supra note 16 (noting the increase in frequency of special
education litigation); see also Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 88, at 354-55 (noting the sharp increase
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ing the burden of proof to schools in such jurisdictions where that allocation has
not already been made. Finally, noted pre-IDEA commentators recommended
allocating the burden to schools as "consistent with fundamental fairness. 4 54
Fifth, the IDEA, unlike statutes that solely protect against discrimina-
tion,455 imposes an "affirmative obligation" on schools.45 6 This obligation,
which one commentator referred to as "accountable access, ''457 is an often-cited
reason for allocating the burden of proof to schools, regardless of which party
requests the due process hearing.458 A school's accountability to parents would
be diluted if it did not have to prove compliance with the IDEA.459 Unlike non-
discrimination statutes such as Section 504 and the ADA, the IDEA provides
specific financial support for the education of children with disabilities.460 The
"affirmative obligation" comes with a financial incentive, and it would make
sense to require school officials to show they have provided a FAPE and have
not gotten something for nothing.
The statute and regulations provide additional support for the notion
that schools should be required to prove they have not "gotten something for
nothing." The IDEA and implementing regulations contain an additional burden
allocation, but one that would not arise in disputes with parents. The statute and
regulations provide that IDEA funds must be used to supplement, not supplant,
other income sources for special education.46' The statute and regulations, how-
ever, allow the Secretary to waive this requirement if the State proves by "clear
and convincing evidence that all children with disabilities have available to
in frequency of tuition reimbursement cases); cf Goldberg & Kuriloff, supra note 18, at 554
("The question then, is really not of doing away with due process [citation omitted], but of finding
ways to prevent disputes between parents and schools from landing in court.").
454 Kirp et al., supra note 77, at 136; cf WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 29-30.
455 Section 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act are examples.
456 See, e.g., Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting). In
Weast, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the IDEA was analogous to such "remedial federal stat-
utes," and such analogy supported allocating the burden of proof to the party initiating the admin-
istrative proceedings. Id. at 453-54. In contrast, the Weast dissent distinguished these statutes,
noting that the IDEA imposes a positive obligation. Id. at 457-58.
457 Mead, supra note 79, at 490. Professor Mead further wrote: "[The IDEA] holds us to a
higher level of accountability in terms of documenting the fruits of our labors and also in justify-
ing the professional child-centered rationales for the decisions we make." Id. The "procedural
safeguards" contained in the IDEA reinforce accountability as a justification for imposing the
burden of proof on schools. Huefner, supra note 65, at 511.
458 Id.; see also Weast, 377 F.3d at 457-58 (Luttig, J., dissenting); Wall v. Mattituck-Cutchogue
Sch. Dist., 945 F. Supp. 501, 511 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("overarching obligation"); Myhill, supra note
398, at 1080 (same); Recent Case, supra note 253, at 1082-84.
459 See, e.g., Huefner, supra note 65, at 511.
460 See ZIRKEL & ALEMAN, supra note 21. We note that Section 504 covers entities receiving
federal financial assistance, see id.; however, that assistance need not be tied to a specific purpose
or program. In contrast, recipients of IDEA funds must spend those funds for a specific purpose.
See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-13 (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.110-396.33 (1999).
461 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(17)(C) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.153 (1999).
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them" a FAPE.4 62 To waive this requirement, SEAs must prove that they pro-
vide a FAPE to all children. They are not entitled to a presumption that they do
so.
Sixth, Congress's "[f]indings '463 when reauthorizing the IDEA in 2004
support our preferred allocation. While first noting the shameful history of ex-
cluding and insufficiently educating children with disabilities prior to the
IDEA,46 Congress notes that the IDEA has been a qualified (but not total) suc-
cess. 4 65 Congress noted that the IDEA's success has been hindered by two fac-
tors: "low expectations, and an insufficient focus on applying replicable re-
search on proven methods of teaching and learning for children with disabili-
ties. ' ,4 6 In our view, these hindrances, expressly identified by Congress, point
directly toward allocating the burden of proof to schools. "Low expectations" is
a common complaint leveled against schools by parents of and advocates for
children with disabilities. 67 To have this complaint echoed by Congress is an
important ground for allocating the burden to schools. Furthermore, the finding
regarding "an insufficient focus on applying . . . research '468 is a powerful cri-
tique of the present educational practices of schools. This is a clear indication
that the status quo and present practices are insufficient. If the status quo on the
macro level is insufficient, this would suggest that schools should bear the bur-
den of proof.
Seventh, the indeterminacy, or risk of erroneous outcomes, associated
with special education litigation outcomes counsel in favor of allocating the
burden of proof. Child welfare disputes are characterized by a high degree of
indeterminacy, 469 and special education disputes are no different. In areas of
law characterized by indeterminacy, a shift in the burden of proof is often out-
come-determinative.470 What constitutes a proper educational program for
many children with disabilities is often extremely controversial and complex,47'
demonstrating indeterminacy. Further, demonstrating indeterminacy is the pat-
tern of outcomes of these disputes, which do not overwhelmingly favor either
schools or parents.472 Given this indeterminacy, who should bear the risk of an
erroneous outcome? The child? The school district? The school district is bet-
462 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(17)(C); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.153(b), 300.589.
463 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c).
I64 d. § 1400(c)(2); see also WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 10-19; Martin et al., supra note 51, at
26-28.
465 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(3)-(4).
466 Id. § 1400(c)(4).
467 See, e.g., Kotler, supra note 70, at 369-72.
468 20 U.S.C.A.. § 1400(c)(4).
469 See, e.g., Moran, supra note 422.
470 Id. See also Anstaett, supra note 10, at 759.
471 See supra notes 1-2; see also Kotler, supra note 70.
472 Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 88, at 354-55; Newcomer & Zirkel, supra note 41, at 474,477.
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ter situated to absorb the cost of an erroneous outcome. If the erroneous deter-
mination harms the child, the child primarily bears the brunt of the harm; in
contrast, if the erroneous determination harms the district, the costs are not
borne by any single individual. Rather, they are spread across society. Accord-
ing to Professor Kotler, "uncertainty must be resolved in favor of the child,"
which is consistent with "the goals underlying the [IDEA]. ' ' 7s
Eighth, experience over the past twenty-five years counsels in favor of
assigning the burden of proof to school districts. Burdens of proof are com-
474monly allocated based on experience. The experience under the current re-
gime has led to confusion and lack of uniformity.475 In our view, the current
experience suggests that something needs to change. One way involves extend-
ing the burden to schools, in areas where the schools do not categorically bear
the burden.476
Finally, while two noted commentators on special education law take no
position on which party should bear the burden of persuasion, they do recom-
mend assigning the burden of production to the schools.477 They recommend
this allocation for two reasons, based on practical considerations. First, "hear-
ings generally arise as a result of parental disagreement with the recommenda-
tion of the LEA, and thus the LEA should first justify its recommendation.
478
Second, "since the evaluators upon whom the LEA relied in making its recom-
mendation will ultimately have to testify, it is efficient and logical to have this
evidence put in the record first.
'479
2. Refuting Arguments Against the Preferred Allocation
In addition to these strong reasons supporting our burden allocation, the
reasons against this burden allocation are particularly weak. The two most
commonly cited are (1) the general rule allocating the burden to the party re-
473 Kotler, supra note 70, at 373; see Kirp et al., supra note 77, at 136-37; see also Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 403, at 34-39.
474 See, e.g., 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2486 ("It is merely a question of policy and fairness
based on experience in the different situations."); see also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189, 209 (1973) (quoting Wigmore); Myhill, supra note 398, at 1079 (quoting Keyes & Wig-
more).
475 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 12; see CLARKE & GLESS, supra note 10, at 13; An-
staett, supra note 10.
476 An interesting topic for empirical research would be whether the allocation of the burden of
proof correlates with outcomes in special education disputes.
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questing the hearing or initiating the action,480 and (2) the idea of deference
owed to school officials.48'
Courts and commentators rejecting requests to allocate the burden to
schools often cite the general rule of evidence assigning the burden of proof to
the party requesting the hearing.482 Most recently, the Fourth Circuit made
much of this rationale.483 Like noted commentators on the law of evidence,4 8
we note that this rationale is riddled with exceptions. Furthermore, to the extent
this is a general rule of administrative law, general principles of administrative
law are in many ways ill-suited to application to special education law, espe-
cially given the IDEA's marked departures from traditional administrative law
485statutes. The "general rule" rationale, for this reason, is particularly weak.
Such a weak "general rule" should not stand in the face of compelling rationales
to the contrary.
Many courts, in rejecting calls to place the burden on schools, cite the
deference owed to school officials.4 86 These courts usually cite language from
Rowley requiring "due weight" to "administrative proceedings. ' ' 87 We find this
rationale particularly unconvincing, for the language cited by these courts to
Rowley does not support this proposition. "Due weight" to "administrative pro-
ceedings" does not necessarily equate to deference to school officials.488 For
example, due process hearings are conducted by impartial hearing officers, who
must not have conflicts of interest or affiliations with the school.489 In contrast,
school officials have their own agendas, resources, and instructional philoso-
phies and delivery systems. An alternate source of this "deference" is equally
suspect. Traditionally and outside of special education litigation, courts have
deferred to the academic decisions of school officials.490 The enactment of the
IDEA, however, is a vast departure from the idea of academic deference, as it
puts parents and potentially the courts in the middle of educational decisions.49'
480 See infra notes 482-85; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 403, at 14-32.
481 See infra notes 486-97.
482 See, e.g., Wenkart, supra note 10; Samuels, supra note 265 (quoting United States' brief
filed in support of the District in Weast).
483 Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 2004).
484 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 337; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2486.
485 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 14 nn. 13 & 22.
486 See, e.g., Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1464 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Doe v. Defendant
1, 898 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (6th Cir. 1990)); Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d
1289, 1292 (11 th Cir. 2001).
487 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
488 See, e.g., Guernsey, supra note 9, at 71-77; see also Choutka et al., supra note 2, at 101.
489 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
490 See, e.g., Terrence Leas, Higher Education, the Courts, and the "Doctrine" of Academic
Abstention, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 135 (1991)
491 This idea of deference may be an appropriate consideration when fixing the standard of
review, however. See, e.g., Krahmal et al., supra note 8; Newcomer & Zirkel, supra note 41.
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Related to this idea of deference is the Weast court's observation that
placing the burden of proof on schools would be to presume that all IEPs, as
well as other school decisions, are inadequate.492 It is not clear why framing the
issue in this manner was enlightening. However, there are several reasons why
framing the issue as one of deference should not be the case. As noted above,
Congressional findings reflect (1) a disgraceful history of excluding children
with disabilities from schooling,493 (2) "low expectations" for students with dis-
abilities,494 and (3) and an insufficient use of research-validated methods of de-
livering special education.495 In light of these three Congressional statements,
why should anyone presume that a school's actions are appropriate? Further-
more, the Weast court's observation is more untenable since no state is in com-
pliance with the IDEA.496 If states, which must ensure497 the provision of FAPE
by local districts, are not in compliance with the IDEA, then it makes perfect
sense to adopt a rule, disfavored by the Weast court, requiring local districts to
prove IDEA compliance.
Some briefs in support of the district in Weast suggest that the Spending
Clause498 is a barrier to the relief the Schaffers seek.499 Assuming this argument
is properly before the Supreme Court,5 ° the argument provides no reason to
affirm the Fourth Circuit's judgment. Under Spending Clause jurisprudence,
Congress may place conditions on the receipt of federal expenditures only when
We also think presuming a school's decision to be inadequate under the IDEA would actually
improve the quality of special education. A shared characteristic of all successful organizations is
the capacity to critically reflect on present practice and cast aside assumptions that hinder growth
and improvement. See, e.g., Michael Hammer & Steven A. Stanton, The Power of Reflection,
FORTUNE, Nov. 24, 1997, at 291-96. This practice of reform and renewal based on reflection is
linked to educational success, including improved special education practice. See, e.g., Linda A.
Patriarca & Margaret A. Lamb, Preparing Secondary Special Education Teachers to Be Collabo-
rative Decision Makers and Reflective Practitioners: A Promising Practicum Model, 13 TCHR.
EDUC. & SPECIAL EDUC. 228 (1990). By placing the burden of proof on schools, school personnel
would be required to consider whether they had met the requirements of the IDEA. This burden
allocation would incorporate the practice of reflection into special education disputes. This would
lead to better educational outcomes for children with disabilities, a prime consideration of Con-
gress when it enacted the IDEA. See supra notes 463-68.
492 Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 455 (4th Cir. 2004).
493 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(2); see also supra notes 426-39, 463-68 and accompanying text.
494 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)( 4 ).
495 Id.
496 WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 4-7 (citing JANE WEST, NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO
SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS (2000)).
497 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a); see also Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 56, at 69-72.
498 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
499 Brief for Respondents, supra note 403, at 28-32; see WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 27.
500 The Fourth Circuit did not rely on Spending Clause cases in its Weast decision. Weast v.
Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004). Query whether the argument was (1) raised below, and
(2) preserved for Supreme Court review.
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it does so "unambiguously., 50 1 A state must accept a condition on federal funds
knowingly, and any condition is invalid where the states are "unaware of the
conditions or [are] unable to ascertain what is expected of [them]. 50 2 This rule
has limited value for three reasons. First, the IDEA is more than a Spending
Clause enactment; rather, it is also a statue to vindicate constitutional claims and
protect constitutional rights.50 3 Second, the IDEA clearly describes the obliga-
tions states are to assume: they are to provide a FAPE to children with disabili-
ties.504 Thus, requiring schools to prove that they have done what the IDEA
requires them to do hardly runs afoul of Spending Clause jurisprudence. Fi-
nally, when a school presented the Supreme Court with a Spending Clause ar-
gument in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garrett F.,505 that argu-
ment could only command a two Justice dissent. 506 The Spending Clause pro-
vides no reason to affirm the Fourth Circuit's decision in Weast.
3. The Inadequacy of Alternate Allocations
In the following paragraphs, we consider the various alternate burden
allocations. We conclude all, for varying reasons and to varying degrees, are
inferior to allocating the burden to the school officials.
Some cases have been interpreted to place the burden categorically on
507parents as parents. We disagree with the interpretation of these cases, as all
of them could be read instead to place the burden on the parent as the party re-
questing the due process hearing. 508 Even if this were the correct reading of
these cases, this is the least preferable of all of the competing burden alloca-
tions. Allocating the burden of proof to parents, as parents, does not cohere
with the IDEA's purpose, language, and history.5° More importantly, allocat-
ing the burden of proof to parents in all circumstances would undermine paren-
501 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
502 Id.
503 See supra notes 426-39, 463-68.
504 See supra Part l.B. The Supreme Court's Spending Clause jurisprudence indicates the
Clause would be violated only when the federal statute did not provide clear notice to recipients
"that they could be liable for the conduct at issue." Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 640 (1999) (emphasis added). The issue here does not concern a school's conduct, but
rather a procedural issue that arises in a school-parent dispute.
505 526 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1999).
506 Id. at 83-85 (Thomas, J., joined by Kennedy, J., dissenting).
507 See, e.g., Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366, 1370 (E.D. Va. 1981); see also HUEFNER &
ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 5 & n.51 (repealed Wisconsin statute placed the burden of persuasion on
parents).
508 The burden allocation in Bales, 523 F. Supp. at 1370, for example, was brief and non-
specific. As the parents in Bales were also the party who requested the hearing, it is just as likely
that the court allocated the burden to the parents based on this other rule.
509 See supra notes 399-405, 426-39, 463-68 and accompanying text.
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tal respect for school authorities and the dispute resolution system, thereby de-
creasing the likelihood of parental involvement with the special education proc-
ess.
5 10
We also disagree with authorities adopting the "general rule" that places
the burden on the party seeking a hearing.51 1 First, as noted above, this "general
rule" is a particularly weak "general rule.' '512 Second, the idea that special edu-
cation cases, which are properly regarded as sui generis, 513 should be treated like
any other legal dispute seems particularly inappropriate, and appears to be fit-
ting square pegs into round holes.514 We suspect that this contributes to the con-
tinued and unwanted legalization of special education disputes.515 Third, this
appears to be a facially neutral rule; however, it favors schools in practice, as
the vast majority of due process requests are filed by parents.516
Finally, this allocation may potentially contribute to delays in prompt
resolution of special education disputes, a major problem with the current sys-
tem. 517 Consider the hypothetical at the beginning of this article. Julia D.'s
parents requested the hearing; however, the dispute about Julia's education had
been lengthy. Assuming that both parties had known of these difficulties, they
may have been engaging in a game of "chicken," with neither party being will-
ing to file for a due process hearing when a consequence of such filing would be
assuming the burden of proof. This is particularly important in cases such as
Julia D.'s, where the evidence is far from clear-cut (if not evenly divided). To
reduce jockeying and gamesmanship and return the focus to the child, the bur-
den of proof should be allocated to the schools, regardless of which party re-
quests the hearing.
510 See supra notes 440-54 and accompanying text.
511 See, e.g., ARKANSAS DEP'T OF EDUC., RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING SPECIAL
EDUCATION AND RELATED SERVICES: PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAM STANDARDS §
10.01.28 (2000); 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-30-3(r) (2005); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-41.117
(2001); 05-071-101 ME. CODE R. § 13.12(I) (Weil 2005); MoNT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3521(1) (2001);
NEB. ADMIN. CODE 92-55-007.01A (2002); Mars Area Sch. Dist. v. Laurie L., 827 A.2d 1249,
1255 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
512 See supra notes 482-85.
513 See, e.g., Zirkel, Revisions, supra note 18, at 408 ("special character of actions under the
IDEA").
514 Cf Marchese, supra note 3.
515 Cf Zirkel, Costs, supra note 18 (discussing the costs associated with the current IDEA
dispute resolution regime).
516 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 410, at 235 (parents requested 1931 of 2005 hearings [96.3 %]);
see also KRISTEN RICKEY & DEE ANN WILSON, IOWA DEP'T OF EDUC., A REPORT ON SPECIAL
EDUCATION DUE PROCESS HEARINGS IN IOWA 9 (2003) (parents requested 44 of 50 hearings [88
%D).
517 The lead author first developed his hypothetical as a potential explanation for a particular
course of proceedings in a particular special education dispute. It remains to be seen whether this
fact pattern is widespread.
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Other undesirable burden allocations do not even have the attribute of
comprehensiveness. One such formulation places the burden on the party pro-
posing the change in the status quo. 518 The chief defect with this allocation is it
does not account for the possibility that both parties may advocate a position
that represents a departure from the status quo.519 For example, in Julia D.'s
case, both parties seek to change the status quo: the school seeks a separate
classroom and her parents seek additional one-on-one programming. Under this
allocation, who would bear the burden of proof? The allocation would be one
more thing for the parties to war over, and one further distraction from the
child's education. Additionally, we disapprove of this allocation because it is
based on a frequently inaccurate view of special education: that an exceptional
child's "status quo" is a desirable default option. We question whether, given
the unique developmental trajectories of many exceptional children and the
trial-and-error, use-whatever-is-available nature of special education practice,
the decision to use the status quo as a default rule absent proof to the contrary is
prudent. It is unwise to arbitrarily prefer a "status quo" that may be impractical
or ineffective. Similar to judicial determinations of the appropriateness of years-
old IEPs,520 debates about departures from the status quo may amount to a waste
of time and resources (at best) and may blur the proper focus: the child's needs
and the school's obligation to meet those needs.
We recognize that some authorities rely on the IDEA's stay-put provi-
sion52 1 to support the "status quo" burden allocation. 522 In our view, stay-put
has nothing to do with burden of proof, and equating the two obscures the
proper inquiry. Stay-put concerns the placement, and sometimes programming,
of the child during a pending dispute.523 It has absolutely nothing to do with
518 See, e.g., Burger v. Murray County Sch. Dist., 612 F. Supp. 434, 437 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Lang
v. Braintree Sch. Comm., 545 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Mass. 1982); Guernsey, supra note 9, at
74. Although certain authors characterize certain federal appellate decisions as adopting the
"change in the status quo" allocation, see Wenkart, supra note 10, we believe those characteriza-
tions are incorrect. In our view, no federal appellate decision adopts this allocation. HUEFNER &
ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 8.
Anne Johnson proposes allocating the burden of proof for substantive issues to the party challeng-
ing the status quo and allocating the burden of proving procedural compliance to the school dis-
trict. Johnson, supra note 10, at 612-22. We think this burden allocation suffers from the defects
associated with a "status quo" allocation. Furthermore, the burden of proving procedural compli-
ance is not longer a meaningful allocation, as the IDEA has been amended to provide that relief
may be granted for procedural violations only to the extent that those procedural violations result
in substantive harms. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
519 As noted above, this approach lacks comprehensiveness. For example, it does not address
issues such as eligibility. HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 8.
520 See, e.g., Zirkel, Revisions, supra note 18, at 404-05.
521 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(j).
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which party should prevail in that dispute, and offers no guidance as to which
party should be required to prove its case.524
We also disagree with those who place the burden of proof on the party
attacking the IEP,525 for this burden allocation is even narrower in scope than
the formulation placing the burden of proof on those seeking to alter the status
quo. It does not account for the situation, as in Julia D.'s case, where both the
school and the parent propose a change to an existing IEP. It does not account
for instances in which a party is not challenging the IEP itself, but challenging
the IEP's implementation. It also does not account for other non-IEP disputes,
"such as eligibility and discipline. 526
Other problems with this formulation are apparent with close thought.
Some courts and hearing officers have extended this burden to parties challeng-
ing a proposed IEP.527 This is objectionable as a matter of policy, and not sup-
ported by the statute's language. 528 To assign the burden of proof to a party
(read, a parent) attacking a school's proposed IEP is to assume the unilateral,
proposed IEP is correct. This would short-circuit the parental protections pro-
vided by the IDEA, and would eliminate an incentive to work with parents of
children with disabilities.52 9 It is particularly inappropriate to assign the burden
of proof to the "party challenging the IEP" when the IEP is over a year old and
has expired, whether by its own terms or by the operation of law, for this would
give legal effect to a document after its lifespan. More importantly, the needs of
the child may have changed with the passage of time, and the IEP may no
longer be appropriate. 30
4. An Exception to the General Rule
We have also considered whether to carve out various exceptions to our
proposed general rule. We believe one exception is appropriate. At step two of
the analysis in a tuition reimbursement case,53' the parents should have the bur-
den of proving the appropriateness of the private placement. This allocation,
524 Id. (discussing Burger, 612 F. Supp. at 437).
525 Id. at 7-8 (discussing cases).
526 Id. at 8.
527 See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Cordrey v. Euckert,
917 F.2d 1460, 1469 (6th Cir. 1990)); Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 39 IDELR 1 173 (SEA
Colo. 2003).
528 See, e.g., HUEFNER & ZrRKEL, supra note 10, at 8 ("If a proposed IEP is contested, then, by
definition, it does not reflect a joint agreement.").
529 If schools could require parents to attack an IEP to which the parents had not agreed, then
schools could circumvent the role given to parents by the IDEA.
530 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 8.
531 See supra note 98.
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already expressly adopted by a few authorities, 52 is consistent with the statute,
rules, and case law concerning tuition reimbursement.
533
It is also consistent with many of the policies supporting allocating the
burden to schools in all other instances. For example, the burden of proof is
often allocated based on which party has better access to needed information. 3
In this instance, it would be the parents, for they selected the private school and
would have better access to the private school's curriculum and available ser-
vices, the student's performance at the private school, and other needed infor-
mation. Additionally, considerations of parental rapport and trust with school
officials535 favor assigning the burden to parents at Step Two.
In a tuition reimbursement case, the primary parent-school relationship
is between the child's parents and the private school, a school the parents pre-
sumably trust. Requiring the public school to prove the private school was not
providing an appropriate education would not enhance the parent-private school
relationship, and requiring the parents to prove the appropriateness of the pri-
vate school's education would not detract from the parent-private school rela-
tionship.
Other authorities, notably the Third Circuit,536 create a broader excep-
tion to the school's burden: the parent has the burden of proof whenever she
proposes a placement further removed from the general education classroom,
often referred to as a more restrictive placement. While this formulation has
some appeal, it has analytical and practical difficulties. First, it assumes the
general education classroom is the LRE, but in actuality, the LRE is inextricably
linked to FAPE. LRE is the setting closest to the general education environment
in which FAPE may be delivered; if FAPE cannot be delivered in the general
education setting, it is not the LRE. Second, if there is a dispute about FAPE or
other non-LRE questions, for which the school should properly bear the burden
of proof, it would seem unfair for the school to avoid its burden by the adversar-
ial alchemy of reframing the dispute as an LRE question. Placement is only one
piece of the special education puzzle, and the school should be required to prove
the appropriateness of all of its decisions, from identification to placement.
Third, one neglects other considerations supporting the allocation of the burden
on schools by placing the burden on parents whenever they propose what ap-
pears to be a more restrictive environment. For example, part of the school's
affirmative obligation537 is to maintain a "continuum of alternative place-
532 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 125A.091, subdiv. 16 (2005); M.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96,
104 (2d Cir. 2000).
533 See supra note 98.
534 See supra notes 406-25.
535 See supra notes 440-54.
536 Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995); see also In re Marie I.,
EHLR 506:291 (Ga. SEA 1985).
537 See supra notes 456-62.
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ments.' '538 The obligation to maintain this continuum carries with it an addi-
tional obligation to propose a placement for the child at the correct point on the
continuum. When placement is an issue, the school should be required to prove
it actually has available such a continuum and justify its location of the child's
proposed placement along that continuum. Furthermore, the school's access to
critical information and specialized knowledge 539 is no different regardless of
whether it is the party proposing a less restrictive or a more restrictive place-
ment. Finally, crucial historical antecedents do not favor shifting the burden. In
Mills v. District of Columbia Board of Education, the school was required to
bear the burden of proof for "any placement," 54° which certainly includes a less
restrictive placement.
The IDEA and its implementing regulations state that each eligible
child's LEP must contain an explanation of the extent to which that child re-
ceives an education away from the general classroom and children without dis-
abilities.5 41 This may appear to create a presumption in favor of the general
classroom. While this provision has been read to place the burden of proof in
this instance on a school proposing a more restrictive placement,542 this provi-
sion should not be read as placing the burden of proof on parents who propose a
more restrictive placement. While this statutory language may enhance the ra-
tionales for placing the burden on schools when the school requests a more re-
strictive placement, it does not overcome the compelling rationales for placing
the burden of proof on the schools in all instances.
Additionally, the existence, nature, and effect of presumptions in the
law are controversial.543 To the extent this statute creates a "presumption" when
a parent proposes a more "restrictive" setting, it should be read as creating a
burden of production only. Once the parent produces enough evidence to gen-
erate a factual issue concerning placement, the presumption vanishes.544 This
approach to presumptions is widely used,545 and is consistent with the treatment
of presumptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 54 Under this approach, the
538 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(a) (1999).
539 See supra notes 406-11.
540 Mills v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 881 (D.D.C. 1972) (emphasis added).
541 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(4).
542 See, e.g., KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, LAW OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS,
TEACHERS IN A NUTSHELL 261 (3d ed. 2003).
543 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 16 n.53.
544 This is called the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions. See 2 STRONG, supra note 15, §
336.
545 Id.
546 FED. R. EVID. 301. For a comprehensive explanation of this rule, see I JACK B. WEINSTEIN
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 301.02[1] et seq. (2d ed. 2003).
While Rule 301 does not apply to administrative hearings, see id. § 301.05(2), it is highly persua-
sive, especially given our proposal to not shift the burden of proof at the judicial stage, see infra
Part IV.B.
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burden of production may shift, but the burden of persuasion remains on the
party who initially bore it (here, the school district).547 This approach is consis-
tent with the general rule that the burden of persuasion does not shift in the
548course of litigation.
B. Judicial Proceedings
Regardless of which party prevails at the administrative level, the bur-
den should not shift when the case moves to court. It should be borne by the
schools in all instances, 549 except when the issue is the appropriateness of the
private school placement selected by parents in a tuition reimbursement case. °
This departure from the general rule in administrative law, that the party chal-
lenging the administrative outcome bears the burden of proof,55' is justified by
the text of the IDEA, the IDEA's legislative history, and considerations of pol-
icy.
First, in judicial proceedings under the IDEA, trial courts retain their
fact-finding function. 2 Reviewing courts do not merely review administrative
fact-findings for legal sufficiency, such as for support by substantial evidence.
They may receive additional evidence not presented to the administrative deci-
sion-maker.553 They retain the fact-finding function even if no additional evi-
dence is introduced.554 Under general principles of evidence, the burden of per-
suasion never shifts as long as facts are still to be found.555 This rule militates in
favor of not shifting the burden of proof at the transition from agency to court.
Second, the IDEA's legislative history further erodes the rationale for
applying the "general rule" in judicial proceedings. When the IDEA was first
adopted, Congress specifically deleted a "substantial evidence" standard of re-
547 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 344; see I WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 546, § 301.02[2]
(citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
548 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2489.
549 See supra notes 397-530.
550 See supra notes 531-35.
551 See, e.g., Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1994).
552 See, e.g., Wall v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Sch. Dist., 945 F. Supp. 501, 511 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
("Because the district court retains a fact-finding role, there is a continuum from the proceedings
at the administrative level to the review in the district court.") (citing Huefner, supra note 65, at
512).
553 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005). That it may be undesirable for
courts to consider additional evidence, see Krahmal et al., supra note 8, does not eliminate the
statutorily conferred power to do so.
554 This is true regardless of the amount of deference given to the administrative decision.
Even if the administrative decision is given a great deal of deference, the statute establishes that
the court still must make findings of fact based on a preponderance of the evidence. For a discus-
sion of scope of review and degrees of deference in special education court cases, see Newcomer
& Zirkel, supra note 41.
555 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2489.
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view.556 While the concepts of scope of review and burden of proof are sepa-
rate, they are still related.557 Congressional action on the IDEA's standard of
review must be considered when determining the IDEA's burden of proof. If
Congress removed the traditional standard of review from the IDEA and thereby
reduced the deference to be granted to administrative decisions, this is a power-
ful signal that other attempts to afford deference to administrative decisions by
reliance on other "general rules" is questionable at best.
Third, policy considerations justify allocating the burden to schools in
judicial proceedings, regardless of which party prevailed below.558 The major
policy reasons for assigning the burden of proof to schools at the administrative
level do not change when the dispute makes the transition to court. By moving
from an agency to a court, schools do not suddenly become less informed about
special education, lose access to key evidence or information, or have less need
to demonstrate they are maintaining their FAPE obligation.559 Parents do not
become more trusting of the school system when the dispute progresses to
court.
5 60
As noted above 56 1 and in other places, 562 special education litigation can
be and often is wasteful and damaging. In many instances, the dispute itself has
become more important than the subject child.563 Allocating the burden of proof
to the school district in judicial proceedings would serve as a hedge against fur-
ther legalization. Allowing the burden of proof to shift on transition between
levels of the special education dispute resolution hierarchy could conceivably
produce perverse outcomes. In close cases, such as the one confronting Profes-
sor Dobson in the opening hypothetical, the burden of proof may be outcome-
determinative. Outcomes in these cases may change simply because the burden
of proof has been reallocated, "causing a musical-chairs wasting of administra-
tive and judicial resources. 5 4
556 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 14 n.22 (citing S. CONF. REP. No. 94-455, at 50
(1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1503).
557 See supra notes 41-47; see also Krahmal et al., supra note 8, at 203-05.
558 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 9-10.
559 See supra notes 406-25. Additionally, the extent to which discovery is available in judicial
proceedings under the IDEA is unsettled. Krahmal et al., supra note 8, at 208.
560 See supra notes 440-54.
561 See supra note 18.
562 See, e.g., Krahmal et al., supra note 8, at 220-21 & n.130; Perry A. Zirkel, Special Educa-
tion: "Needless Adversariness ", 74 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 809, 810 (1993); see also Antonis Katsi-
yannis & Maria Herbst, Minimize Litigation in Special Education, 40 INTERVENTION SCH. &
CLINIC 106 (2004); cf Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (de-
scribing IDEA's dispute resolution mechanism as "ponderous").
563 Zirkel, Revisions, supra note 18, at 407-08 & nn.26-30.
564 HUEFNER & ZIRKEL, supra note 10, at 10. In addition, one of the authors of the present
article, based on experience trying a wide variety of cases (with the attending pre-trial discovery
"chess matches"), believes a fixed burden of proof would remove an incentive to choose not to
introduce all favorable evidence at an administrative hearing and to use this withheld evidence in
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The Ninth Circuit offered the strongest defense of the traditional posi-
tion in Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District No. 3.565 In the passage previously
quoted,566 the Clyde K. court set forth several reasons why it adopted the "gen-
eral rule," including that (1) the substantive fight conferred on parents by the
IDEA does not entitle parents "to receive every procedural advantage" and (2)
the absence of statutory language indicating a departure from the general rule of
burden allocation.5 67  We find these reasons insufficient. First, as noted
above,568 the general rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit is particularly weak and
fiddled with exceptions,569 and the strength of the substantive and procedural
fights accorded to parents under the IDEA should override a particularly weak
"general rule." Second, the judiciary, absent a statutory pronouncement,57°
should be free to allocate the burden of proof based on considerations of "policy
and fairness based on experience in the different situations., 57' Based on "pol-
icy and fairness," the judiciary ought to allocate the burden of proof in judicial
proceedings in the same manner as it is allocated in administrative proceedings.
C. The Need for Uniformily
Additional considerations counsel in favor of uniformity in allocating
the burden of proof. This subpart makes the case for uniform adoption of our
preferred burden of proof.
572
Core principles of federal-state relations require the adoption of a uni-
form application of burden-of-proof rules. This is because of the unique nature
of the judicial review process in special education. Federal and state courts
further court actions. To this author, it is certainly conceivable (though not currently quantifiable)
that some parents may decide not to introduce some favorable piece of evidence (however minor
it might be) at the administrative stage, knowing that they would have the burden of proof under
the "traditional view" if they filed a court action. The evidence not introduced would then be-
come a device by which parents would seek to justify overturning the adverse administrative
hearing. The use of additional evidence (that is, evidence not presented at the administrative
level) in special education disputes wastes time and money. Krahmal et al., supra note 8, at 216-
17, 220. More importantly, it leads to hearing officers making decisions based on incomplete
records. Id. at 218-19. Allocating the burden of proof to schools in all instances would remove a
conceivable, structural incentive to "save" evidence for potential use in judicial proceedings.
565 35 F.3d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir 1994). For more information on the Ninth Circuit's burden
allocation, see supra Part III.J.
566 See supra note 370 and accompanying text (quoting Clyde K., 35 F.3d at 1399).
567 Clyde K., 35 F.3d at 1399.
568 See supra notes 482-85.
569 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2486, at 288.
570 Cf 2 STRONG, supra note 15, § 337, at 413-14 (stating burden allocation is often a "judicial
estimate of the probabilities of the situation" (emphasis added)).
571 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2486, at 291.
572 Thirteen states, urging the Supreme Court to grant the Schaffers' certiorari petition, made
this very point. See Hendrie, supra note 264 (briefly describing this argument).
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have concurrent jurisdiction to review state administrative decisions.573 This is
an unusual arrangement. A hearing officer like Professor Dobson may poten-
tially find herself wondering which of two sets of burden of proof allocations to
follow. In many jurisdictions, a state law (statutes, regulations, or court deci-
sions) burden allocation may differ from federal case law on the subject. Fur-
ther, when interpreting federal law, state courts are not necessarily bound by the
decisions of lower federal courts.57 4 Thus, a state trial court and a federal trial
court, each applying two different legal rules, may potentially review a hearing
officer's decision, and the rule applied may be outcome-determinative.
Sometimes, courts attempt to seek uniformity. In Montour School Dis-
trict v. S.T., 71 the Pennsylvania appellate court sought to follow federal prece-
dent concerning the statute of limitations under the IDEA.576 Other times, court
decisions create dissonance. For example, Pennsylvania state court decisions
conflict with Third Circuit precedent concerning the standard of review.577
More importantly, Pennsylvania state and federal courts differ in allocating the
burden of proof.578 This situation is not unique to Pennsylvania.579 This issue
lurks in the First,580 Fourth, 581 Eighth,5 82 Ninth,583 and Eleventh584 Circuits. In
573 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (1999).
574 U.S. ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970); Montour Sch.
Dist. v. S.T., 805 A.2d 29, 39-40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Thompson v. Viii. of Hales Comers,
340 N.W.2d 704, 712-13 (Wis. 1983); see Lagares v. Camdenton R-I11 Sch. Dist., 68 S.W.3d 518
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (state court not bound by federal court interpretation of state law); see also
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In our federal system, a
state trial court's interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than that of the federal court
of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is located.") (dicta).
575 See Montour, 805 A.2d at 40.
576 Zirkel, Montour, supra note 8, at 23.
577 Id. at 23 n. 14 1.
578 Compare Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (burden on school)
with Mars Area Sch. Dist. v. Laurie L., 827 A.2d 1249, 1255 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (burden on
party seeking hearing).
579 See generally supra Part HI (providing a Circuit-by-Circuit review of burden of proof allo-
cations).
580 Compare T.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 82 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004)
(burden on school at hearing), with 05-071-101 ME. CODE R. § 13.12(l) (Weil 2005) (burden on
party requesting hearing).
581 Compare Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2004) (burden at administrative
hearing on party requesting hearing) with W.VA. CODE R. § 126-16-8.1.11(c) (2003) (burden on
school in administrative hearing).
582 Compare E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 196, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998) (burden on the
school in administrative hearings) with state regulations in Arkansas, Iowa, and Nebraska, see
supra note 362 (burden on the party seeking the administrative hearing).
583 Compare Clyde K. v Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (burden
on school at administrative hearing) with MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.16.3521(1) (2001) (burden on party
requesting hearing).
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an extremely close case in such jurisdictions, such as the one confronting Pro-
fessor Dobson, reversal could easily occur solely based on which forum was
selected.585
Assume Professor Dobson's hearing is in Pennsylvania, not Catatonic
State. If she applies Pennsylvania precedent 586 and rules for the district because
she allocates the burden to Julia D.'s parents, the parents could certainly appeal
to federal district court, which would apply the Oberti burden allocation and
allocate the burden of proof to Euphoria.587 Reversal would be likely. In con-
trast, should Professor Dobson follow federal court precedent and rule in favor
of Julia D.' s parents because Euphoria failed to meet its burden of proof, Eupho-
ria could then seek review in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which
would allocate the burden to Julia D.'s parents.588 Reversal would be likely.
This is an entirely unacceptable situation, which provides neither swift nor cer-
tain resolutions to special education disputes. Nor should the result vary, de-
pending solely on the child's state of residence. To achieve the rapid resolution
of special education disputes, a uniform approach to the burden of proof should
be adopted, 589 and that approach should place the burden on school districts as
set forth above.59 °
We would recommend the United States Supreme Court adopt this allo-
cation in Schaffer. If the Supreme Court does not do so, we would recommend
corrective action by Congress, as Congress has done in the past when it dis-
agreed with the policy implications of the Court's IDEA cases.591 Regardless of
the outcome of Schaffer, we would recommend that Congress take action to
place the burden of proof in judicial proceedings under the IDEA on the school
authorities, with the exceptions noted in this article, an issue not before the
Court in Schaffer.
V. CONCLUSION
In the opening hypothetical, Professor Dobson should assign the burden
of proof to the Euphoria Independent School District. Doing so, she should rule
584 Compare Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1291-92 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(burden on party attacking "existing IEP") with Alabama and Georgia regulations, see supra notes
312-15 (burden on schools at administrative hearing).
585 Cf Hendrie, supra note 264.
586 Mars Area Sch. Dist. v. Laurie L., 827 A.2d 1249 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
587 Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993).
588 See supra notes 586-87.
589 By a uniform approach, we mean a uniform minimum requirement. We recognize states
could choose to provide more protection than that provided by the IDEA. See Mayes & Zirkel,
supra note 56, at 89. Should a state choose to adopt a burden allocation that is more favorable to
parents, then that approach would be applied.
590 See supra Part IV.
591 See, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 17, at 241 n.25.
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for Julia D.'s parents if the school failed to prove its case. This result is pre-
ferred for several reasons.592 It is supported by statutory considerations (includ-
ing express findings by Congress) and historical antecedents. It is supported by
sound public policy, including a recognition of schools' superior access to in-
formation and the proper allocation of the risk of erroneous decisions. It is con-
sistent with fairness and would promote healthy parent-school dialogue. More-
over, similar considerations, including Congress's findings, make arguments
against the preferred burden allocation and in favor of other allocations uncon-
vincing, even though those arguments rely on purportedly neutral general
rules.593
Furthermore, when the dissatisfied party appeals Professor Dobson's
decision to state or federal court, the burden should be borne by the school, re-
gardless of who prevailed below. The reasons for this proposed allocation are
similar to reasons for allocating the burden to the schools at the administrative
level.594
Finally, consider the following variation on Professor Dobson's di-
lemma. Assume Julia D.'s parents are requesting tuition reimbursement for a
unilateral private school placement and the school has failed to prove its pro-
posed program offered a FAPE. In that instance, Professor Dobson should re-
quire Julia D.'s parents to prove the appropriateness of their unilateral place-
ment. This departure from the general rule is supported by the structure of the
IDEA, basic fairness, and sound public policy.
595
We would like to close with one last thought. If schools are concerned
about meeting whatever burden may be allocated to them or about the cost of
bearing the burden of proof,596 they need only carry out the intent of the law
with respect to identification, evaluation, programming, and placement. 597 if
they do so, they need not worry about shouldering the burden of proof.
598
592 See supra Part IV.A. 1.
593 See supra Parts IV.A.2 and IV.A.3.
594 See supra Part IV.B.
595 See supra Part IV.A.4.
596 Cf. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 27.
597 Cf. Mayes & Zirkel, supra note 88, at 357.
598 Cf. Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) ("This is IDEA's mandate,
and school officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement claims.").
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